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Abstract 
Fraud is a problem for the all kinds companies, both large and small. According to a study be 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners could be even 5% of the whole world Gross Domestic 
Product leading to approximately $4 trillion losses. The financial statement fraud is the costliest 
form of fraud, when it occurs with a median loss of $800.000 per case. However, in 22% of the 
cases of financial statement fraud the loss is over $1.000.000. The problem is that the main way of 
finding fraud has been whistleblowing. There is a clear need of other effective methods to finding 
fraud. In case of financial statement fraud one can attempt to use artificial intelligence methods to 
predict whether a financial statement is fraudulent or not. Usually this has been studied using 
models, which only whether the financial statement is fraudulent or not. Here also the type of fraud 
is studied, so that one could start to use the information for predicting in which part of the financial 
statement the fraud is in. 
We use dataset combined from Audit Analytics and Compustat datasets from Wharton Research 
Data Services. The data is for years 1995-2016 and consists of prediction variables, which are 
formed using financial statement data and other public data for the companies. Altogether there are 
347 fraudulent financial statements and 58.892 non-fraudulent financial statements in the final 
dataset. 9 different predictive models are formed using regularized logistic regression and 35 
predictive variables. 1 predictive model is for fraud as a whole, 8 are for different fraud types.  
Finally a predictive model of fraud is built using 3 different fraud types and compared whether it 
produces better results than modelling fraud directly. Of the 35 predictive variables 7 turn out to 
appear in at least 8 of the 9 different models: whether new securities were issued, value of issued 
securities to market value, accounts receivable, accounts receivable to total assets, is the auditor 
one of Big 4, net sales and whether standard industry classification code is between 3000-3999 or 
not. 
The performance of the models to predict fraud or fraud type is measured using expected relative 
cost of misclassification, accuracy, precision, sensitivity, receiving operating curves and areas 
under the receiving operating curves. Receiving operating curves for fraud and fraud types are 
quite similar, so are their areas under the operating curves, which is 0,71 for fraud and 0,68 for the 
combination of 3 fraud types. The rest of the results depend on the prior fraud probability in the 
world, which is taken to be between 0,1% - 10%, and the ratio of cost of misclassifying fraud as 
non-fraud to cost of misclassifying non-fraud as fraud, which varies between 1:1 and 100:1. The 
accuracy, which measures the percentage of correct classifications among all cases, is between 
80% - 99% for the combination of three types and 81% - 99% for fraud. The precision, which 
measures the percentage of correct fraud classifications among all predicted fraud cases, varies 
between 1,3% - 3,5% for fraud and 1,4% - 4,2% for the combination of three types, these numbers 
are low because of the huge imbalance between fraudulent and non-fraudulent cases. The 
sensitivity, which measures the percentage of correct fraud classifications among all the actual 
fraud cases, varies between 1,4% - 42% for fraud and between 1,7% - 48% for the combination of 
three types. The expected relative cost of misclassification for the combination of three types by -
3,7% - +0,05% compared to fraud depending on prior fraud probability and relative costs of 
misclassification. The combination of three types perform better in predicting fraud than direct 
fraud prediction in most cases prior fraud probability and relative cost of misclassification. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and background 
Financial statements form the basis of valuation of business entities Palepu and Healy (2007). 
Especially the stock market uses them and even demands quarterly updates in addition to the 
usual annual financial statements. The stock price can change quite a lot when the financial 
figures are published for the business entity if it shows either better than expected result or 
worse than expected result. Therefore it is of utmost importance that the financial statements 
contain accurate information. Whenever mistakes in the financial statements are found and 
published, the stock price tends to do a correction. There are also other stakeholders who want 
accurate financial information like banks considering a loan for the entity want typically to see 
the financial statement of the entity and make the loan decision based on that information. If 
the financial statement contains wrong information, the decision is made on false premises and 
may lead into defaulting the loan. 
One of the most costly mistakes of the financial statement is fraud. Fraud can exist in three 
forms according to the report by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), see 
ACFE (2018). These are asset misappropriation, corruption and financial statement fraud 
which occurred in 89%, 38% and 10% of the cases ACFE observed in their study.
1
 Median 
losses per case for the three categories of fraud are $114.000, $250.000 and $800.000 
respectively. Therefore the most occurring type is least costly and the least occurring financial 
statement fraud is the most costly of the types of fraud. ACFE found in their study that the 
total losses due to fraud were at least $7.1 billion dollars in 2017.
2
 However, they asked 
estimates of the amount fraud what the financial professionals think and came up with 5% of 
the total. Comparing this to the world GDP in 2017 $79.6 trillion, the 5% figure results into 
approximately $4 trillion, almost a thousand times the number ACFE identified in their study. 
So fraud is a serious problem and financial statement fraud, although the least common is the 
most costly to an entity. 
                                                          
1
 The percentages do not add up to 100% but are more than that because more than 1 type of fraud can co-
exist in a case. 
2
 The number is produced by changing the bottom 1% to the 1% value and the top 1% to the 99% value since 
the high numbers might have identified the entities in question. 
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The problem of the fraud is that it is hard to find. According to the ACFE report fraud is 
initially found through tips in 40% of the cases, 15% by internal audits, 13% by management 
review, 7% by accident, external audits in 4% of the cases and IT controls in 1% of the cases. 
There are also other means by which fraud is found but these are more rarely. Although IT 
controls find fraud only in 1% of the cases, they find it fastest, typically in 5 months, whereas 
internal audits, management review and tips take 12, 14 and 18 months respectively. Most 
typically the one reporting fraud is an employee in 53% of the cases, customer 21%, 
anonymous 14% and other categories each under 10%.
3
 The costs of fraud are distributed such 
that in 55% of the cases the amount $200.000 or less, $200.000 - $1.000.000 in 23% of the 
cases and cost of fraud over $1.000.000 happens in 22% of the cases. 
In this study we concentrate on financial statement fraud and how to find that. As mentioned 
earlier it has the least amount of occurrence, but it is the most costly type of fraud. Since fraud 
is hard to find there have been attempts to find financial statement fraud using statistical and 
artificial intelligence (AI) methods, most notably the study by Perols (2011). Perols and others 
have attempted to find financial statement fraud by using earlier data on financial statements 
and observed frauds to make a prediction whether the latest financial statement is fraudulent or 
not. Similar attempts have been made to predict misstatements in financial statements, see for 
example Dutta et al. (2017). 
Practically all the articles observed have asked the question whether a financial statement is 
fraudulent or not, or in case of misstatements whether there is a misstatement or not in the 
financial statement. If you are someone who is actually trying find fraud, you would be glad if 
you get some kind of prediction whether a financial statement is fraudulent or not, but that 
does not get you very far. It does not tell anything about where the fraud is except that it is 
somewhere in the process of making the financial statement. If I were the one looking for it, I 
would like to know a bit more about where to look for it: revenue, purchases, receivables, 
payables etc. Something to narrow down the search. On the other hand an outside stakeholder 
might not be so interested in knowing what part of the financial statement is fraudulent, but 
rather what is its financial impact on the financial statement, how much is the profit affected 
                                                          
3
 Note that these numbers contain all types of fraud, not just financial statement fraud. 
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by the fraud. Also someone looking for the fraud might want to know the financial impact in 
order to determine how much effort and resources to use for finding fraud. 
 
1.2 Research question and purpose of the study 
Being able to know whether a financial statement is fraudulent or not is definitely good to 
know. However, it is not enough. Knowing that financial statement is fraudulent does not tell, 
in which part of the financial statement the fraud is. Therefore this study attempts to go further 
to predict also the type of financial statement fraud, which hopefully gives information on 
which part of the financial statement the fraud is. In the end one would like to know in what 
part of the accounting the fraud is, but research has to be restricted because of the data 
available. Usually one does not have available anything other than the public financial 
statement, so one has to be satisfied in finding out which part of the financial statement the 
fraud is. Anyone having the whole accounting information accessible might be able to go 
further. 
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) contains financial statement information in 
COMPUSTAT database and restatement information in the Audit Analytics database. The 
restatements contain the reason for making the restatement. In most cases the reason is a 
regular misstatement, but in a few cases the reason is fraud. There is also information on what 
type of fraud was the reason for the restatement, for example one category is Revenue 
Recognition Issues. The type of fraud is used as a proxy for where to find the fraud. One might 
also think about using Audit Analytics data to predict the financial impact on the financial 
statement, but this is not possible. WRDS just does not have this data, but it is possible to get 
from commercial side of Audit Analytics. For this reason the financial impact prediction has 
to be left for possible future research. Personally I would find the financial impact prediction 
to be even more interesting and useful for wider audience than predicting the type of fraud. 
Perols mentioned in his article that data on fraud is quite noisy and the same signal could 
indicate fraud and non-fraudulent activities, see Perols (2011). It is worth looking into whether 
prediction of fraud type produces better results or not. This type of thing has actually been 
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done by Perols et al. (2017) with the same dataset that was used by Perols (2011). If even one 
fraud type is observed, then the financial statement is fraudulent. However, since the fraud 
type prediction is not perfect, rather than making a fraud prediction based on just one fraud 
type prediction, one might get a better result by implementing a voting system. If majority of 
fraud type predictions predict the corresponding fraud type in the financial statement, then one 
predicts the financial statement to be fraudulent, otherwise it is predicted non-fraudulent. This 
might help in the fraud detection since different fraud types might be sensitive to fewer signals 
than aggregating all types of fraud into a single fraud category. This is also the basis for 
division into 4 different types in Perols et al. (2017). Their division was based on the fraud 
belonging to a particular side of the balance sheet or being revenue or cost. Here the fraud 
types are based on the categories given by the Audit Analytics dataset. 
Most of the previous work, except Perols et al. (2017), has gone like 
 Variables -> Predict fraud or non-fraud 
Instead we modify the procedure to two phases 
 For all fraud types make a fraud type prediction: 
Variables -> Predict is of fraud type or not of fraud type  
Results of fraud type predictions -> Predict fraud if majority of fraud type predictions  
predict that fraud type, otherwise non-fraud 
 
After the introduction we suggest the following research questions 
 
 RQ1:  Can the type of financial statement fraud be predicted? 
 RQ2:  If yes, can the financial statement fraud type prediction be used to find fraud 
   more effectively than using fraud as a single category? 
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Research question 1 deals with the first phase of trying to predict fraud through fraud types. 
Research question 2 handles the second phase of predicting fraud once the predictions of fraud 
types are made and comparing it to the direct method of predicting fraud from the variables 
directly. 
 
1.3 Research method 
The method used is quantitative. The data is gathered from WRDS using Compustat and Audit 
Analytics datasets. The two datasets are then combined on the company and financial year 
levels to find which financial statements are fraudulent and which types of fraud they contain. 
The datasets are then partitioned into 5 folds of training and test sets. The training data is fitted 
using logistic regression and then predictions are made on the corresponding test that was held 
out of fitting. All the presented results are based on test set. However, due to how cross 
validation works the union of test sets over the 5 folds results into the original dataset with 
predicted probabilities for each fraud type. More on this in the section 3 on data and methods. 
 
1.4 Structure of the study 
The thesis is structured as follows: in section 2 literature is reviewed with subsections on the 
fraud and misstatement literature, and based on the review the variables which are used to 
detect fraud are defined and the reasons for using them are presented, in section 3 the method 
of study and the performance measures of the model are reviewed, and how the dataset is 
formed, in section 4 the results presented, in section 5 the results are discussed and in section 6 
conclusions and future research propositions are presented. 
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2 Literature review and theory 
Financial statement fraud is part of the larger financial misstatements category. Both have 
their own literature, but there is overlap in the methods used. Therefore both categories are 
reviewed. The misstatements are reviewed only when relevant to the study here. Other 
methods, besides the ones used, are also reviewed in the last subsection. 
 
2.1 Literature review 
2.1.1 Financial statement fraud literature 
 
The most relevant article for the study here is Perols (2011). Perols points out in his study 
many of particular features of financial statement fraud: 1) the ratio of fraud to non-fraud 
firms is small i.e. there are much more non-fraudulent financial statements than there are 
fraudulent financial statements, 2) The ratio of false positive to false negative misclassification 
costs is small meaning making a mistake of classifying non-fraud as fraud is much less 
expensive than making a mistake of classifying fraud as non-fraud, 3) the attributes used to 
detect fraud are noisy, same values may signal both fraudulent and non-fraudulent activities 
and 4) persons committing fraud try to conceal their actions making financial statements look 
non-fraudulent. His main point of study was to compare different machine learning algorithms 
while taking into account the distinctive features of the problem. He combined data from 
Compustat, Compact D/SEC and I/B/E/. He had in his final sample 51 fraud firms and 15934 
non-fraud firms, so that the prior fraud probability was 0.3% (51 / 15934). He found that 
instead of the much more complicated machine learning models, the simpler models, logistic 
regression and support vector machine, performed best in low prior fraud probability 
environment. This was in contrast to other studies, where the ratio of fraudulent to non-
fraudulent financial statements was much closer to 1 and for example they found that neural 
networks perform better than simple models. The performance measure used was expected 
relative costs of making false predictions. 
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Green and Choi (1997) studied the problem using neural networks with a balanced sample 
namely between 86 and 95 fraudulent financial statements and the same amount of non-
fraudulent financial statements. They obtained an aggregate error rate of 25%. When one 
compares to making a coin toss, where the error rate is 50%, this is definitely lower. However, 
other types of measures taking into account the different costs were not used. Besides 
accuracy or error rate (error rate = 1 – accuracy) as a whole may not be a good performance 
measure in reality. In the balanced sample with the same amount of fraudulent and non-
fraudulent financial statements this works, but with highly imbalanced samples, which the 
fraud in reality is, the accuracy can be a bad measure. For example if there are 1% of fraud in 
reality, one can get a 99% accurate classifier by classifying every case as non-fraud. This kind 
of classifier would find no fraud cases whatsoever, so as such it is clearly a bad classifier for 
the purpose. 
Lin et al. (2003) used a fuzzy neural network with 40 fraudulent and 160 non-fraudulent 
financial statements and compared it with the logit model. The results for logit were overall 
accuracy 79%, actual fraud over total predicted fraud 5% and actual non-fraud over total 
predicted non-fraud 97,5%. On the other hand the fuzzy neural network had overall accuracy 
of 76%, actual fraud over total predicted fraud 35% and actual non-fraud over total predicted 
non-fraud 86,3%. So fuzzy neural network found fraud better than logit model even though the 
overall accuracy of fuzzy neural network was lower. Although the sample was not really of the 
realistic type, 20% fraud and 80% non-fraud, they analysed the overall error rate using 
realistic prior probabilities of fraud, namely they estimated prior probability to be 1%. They 
also calculated the expected costs with relative costs of misclassifying errors predicting fraud 
as non-fraud over predicting non-fraud as fraud from 1:1 to 100:1. They found that fuzzy 
neural network performed better than logit model, when the relative cost exceeded 40:1. 
Below that the logit model performed better. 
Perols and Lougee (2011) study the relationship between earnings management and financial 
statement fraud.
4
 They found that the firms, which commit fraud, are more likely to have 
committed earnings management in years prior to committing fraud. They also found an 
association between earnings management in the prior years and higher likelihood of firms 
                                                          
4
 Financial statement fraud is referred as here as fraud. 
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meeting or beating analyst forecasts or inflating their revenues are committing fraud, too. In 
addition fraud firms are more likely to meet or beat analyst forecasts and inflate revenue than 
non-fraud firms even when there is no evidence of prior earnings management. The reason 
why prior earnings management can lead to later fraud is that initially earnings are managed 
by manipulating accruals. Now that the accruals are in the balance sheet they have to be dealt 
with later on either by reversing them and dealing with the consequences of it or by 
committing fraud to hide them. As Perols and Lougee point out the purpose of earnings 
management and financial statement fraud is very similar. They cite Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
in the definition of earnings management: “earnings management occurs when managers use 
judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to 
either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company 
or to influence contractual outcomes that rely on reported accounting numbers”. Perols and 
Lougee (2011) define financial statement fraud as “financial statement fraud occurs when 
managers use accounting practises that do not conform to generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that 
rely on reported accounting numbers”. As seen in the two definitions the purpose of earnings 
management and financial statement fraud is the same, but earnings management happens 
within GAAP and is legal, whereas fraud happens outside GAAP and is illegal. Based on this 
the variables that are used to detect earnings management can also be used to detect fraud. 
Dechow et al. (1996) study the causes and consequences of earnings manipulation. This is not 
a study of fraud in essence. However, as mentioned above by Perols and Lougee, earnings 
management and fraud are associated with each other. Their main findings are that important 
motivation for earnings management is the desire to attract external financing at low cost. And 
firms engaging in earnings management are more likely to have boards of directors dominated 
by management, i.e. to have a Chief Executive Officer that is at the same time the Chairman of 
the Board and also the firm’s founder. They are less likely to have an audit committee and an 
outside blockholder. When the earnings management becomes public knowledge, the firms 
engaging in it, are more likely to have their costs of capital increased significantly. The main 
value of this study for fraud detection is that the variables they develop for finding earnings 
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management can also be used in fraud detection and a few of them were included in Perols  
(2011). 
Beneish (1997) also studies earnings management. However, the sample actually consists of 
firms that either SEC has charged with violating GAAP or which have publicly admitted to 
violating GAAP. So if one uses the definition in Perols and Lougee (2011), this study should 
rather be classified as study of financial statement fraud. There are two primary results: the 
model used provides means to assess the likelihood or earnings management among firms 
with large discretionary accruals, and adding lagged total accruals and a measure of past price 
performance as explanatory variables can help in isolating the discretion among firms with 
extreme performance. Besides suggesting variables that can also be used for fraud detection, 
Beneish also used the expected misclassification costs to assess the model performance, as 
was done originally in Dopuch et al. (1987) and later in Perols (2011). 
Fanning and Cogger (1998) used an artificial neural network (ANN) with 20 variables to 
predict fraud. The corresponding logistic regression model was not successful in contrast to 
Perols (2011). However, Fanning and Cogger had a sample where there were 102 fraudulent 
financial statements and 102 non-fraudulent financial statements. So the sample is balanced 
instead of what Perols pointed out, fraud is rare and the sample should be highly imbalanced 
to reflect that. Using a balanced sample to estimate the performance of the models may lead to 
results that are not correct. The model can be fitted on the balanced sample but performance 
evaluation has to be done on the imbalanced sample. Nevertheless the 20 predictor variables 
contain good candidates for the fraud detection, many of which were used in Perols’ study. 
Feroz et al. (2000) made another study with artificial neural networks and logistic regression. 
They also found that the ANNs perform better than logistic regression. Their sample contained 
42 fraudulent financial statements and 90 non-fraudulent financial statements. Their results are 
in accordance with Fanning and Cogger (1998), but would seem to be in contrast to Perols 
(2011). However, like Fanning and Cogger the sample is almost balanced and far from an 
actual situation. In order to remedy this they actually tested with imbalanced samples, too, by 
changing proportion of fraud and non-fraud samples from 10 % and 90% division with 10% 
steps to a balanced 50% and 50% sample. They used only 7 predictor variables for fraud. They 
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provided results both for classification accuracy and expected relative costs. Surprisingly 
classification accuracy is better with an ANN, but expected relative cost tends to be lower for 
logistic regression, when the cost of classifying fraud as non-fraud is at most 40 times as large 
as the cost of classifying non-fraud as fraud. However, above this the ANN is less costly. 
Therefore the expected relative cost is actually in accordance with the results of Perols. 
Kaminski et al. (2004) used discriminant analysis with 79 fraud firms and 79 non-fraud firms, 
which were of similar size and industry type to the fraud firms. They had 21 predictor 
variables, of which they found 16 to be significant based on discriminant analysis. Again the 
usage of balanced sample for estimating performance as a problem. 
Lee et al. (1999) use logistic regression model with earnings minus operating cash flow as the 
predictor variable with control variables to test its usefulness for predicting financial statement 
fraud. They find that results with this variable included are much better than without it. Their 
sample consisted of financial statements covering years 1978 – 1991 with 56 fraud cases and 
60453 non-fraud cases. Originally they had 21 predictor variables, of which they chose 13 into 
the final model mainly based on not having missing data. Here is one of a few studies with 
realistic sample sizes and imbalance between fraud and non-fraud. 
Kanapickiene and Grundiene (2015) is a Lithuanian study with 40 fraudulent and 125 non-
fraudulent financial statements. They use financial ratios as predictor variables and logistic 
regression. They study 51 different variables and choose 32 in the end. They report 84,8% 
classification accuracy with their model. Question is of course whether this is at a realistic 
level since the sample is quite small and sample is close to balanced. Unless fraud in Lithuania 
is much more widespread than generally believed by ACFE (2018), the sample should contain 
more non-fraudulent financial statements. Second point is that the study does not take into 
account the different costs related to mistaking fraud as non-fraud compared to mistaking non-
fraud as fraud. 
Perols et al. (2017) continues the work done in Perols (2011). They study advanced 
subsampling methods, multi-subset observation and variable undersampling, in order to deal 
with the rareness of financial statement fraud. They also do a variation of variable 
undersampling, where variables are divided into smaller groups according to the fraud type in 
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question. This article seems to be the first to have studied fraud types. They use the same 
sample, which Perols (2011) originally used in his study, but the number of predictor variables 
is increased from 42 to 109. The result is that the expected relative costs with observation 
undersampling are reduced by 10,8 percent relative to the best benchmark in Perols (2011), 
and with variable undersampling including fraud types by 9,6 percent relative to the best 
performing variable undersampling benchmark. Combining observation and variable 
undersampling with fraud types improves performance further under certain conditions. One 
difference in procedure compared to what was used in Perols (2011) is that in the previous 
study Perols made the variable selection on the whole dataset, and after that divided the 
dataset into training and test sets. If one wants the test set results to be generalizable to finding 
new cases of fraud, the test set should be held out, so that it is not part of the variable selection 
and fitting process. The variable selection and fitting process should be done in the training set 
and use its results on the test set. In Perols et al. (2017) the procedure is to first divide into 
training and test sets, and then do the variables selections and model fitting on the training set, 
and finally measure the performance on the test set, so they do it in a way, where the results 
are generalizable. 
 
2.1.2 Financial misstatement literature relevant for fraud detection 
 
Dechow et al. (2011) use as a source the SEC’s AAERs from the years 1982 – 2005. The 
study is on misstatements. The final sample consists of 676 firms with at least one annual or 
quarterly misstated financial statement. They develop a scaled probability, F-score, which can 
be used as a red flag for a misstatement. They found that all measures of accrual quality are 
unusually high in misstating years compared to the population of non-misstated. They also 
found that the percentage of soft assets is high giving more flexibility to change and adjust 
assumptions to influence short-term earnings. Accrual reversals are also an important 
signature of a misstatement. The variables used here were included in the study Perols et al. 
(2017). 
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Dutta et al. (2017) study the financial misstatements using the same kinds of methods as 
Perols (2011) for financial statement fraud. Among the variables they use 34 of the 42 
predictor variables used by Perols. The total number of predictor variables is 115, which they 
reduce to 15 using stepwise forward selection to remove less significant or redundant 
variables. Among the final 15 variables are 5 variables used by Perols for fraud detection, 5 
variables used in Dechow et al. (2011) and the remaining 5 are traditional financial or 
accounting variables. They used 5 different machine learning methods, logistic regression is 
not among the methods they used. They give the performance of the models using the usual 
performance measures for binary classification: accuracy, precision, recall or sensitivity, false 
positive rate, specificity, F-measure and area under the curve. The financial statements they 
use are obtained from Compustat and information about misstatements from Audit Analytics 
restatements. The same source has been used in this study and the procedure to clean the data 
in this study follows the procedure laid out in Dutta et al. (2017) and modifies it where 
relevant, since this study concentrates on fraud detection. The data sample by Dutta et al. 
consisted of financial statements between 2001 – 2014. They also made a study of 
performance by splitting the data to 2001-2007 and 2008-2014 and found no significant 
difference between the performances over the whole sample and the two subsamples. 
 
2.2 Theory 
As pointed out by Perols (2011) fraud is being actively concealed by the perpetrators of it. 
Fraud is also rare. These two factors make it difficult to find. In order to find it using 
analytical/statistical methods a lot of variables have been suggested in the literature for 
predicting fraudulent financial statements. In Perols et al. (2017) there were 109 predictor 
variables to start with. According to Green and Choi (1997) an auditor needs to use 
professional judgement to choose variables that predict fraud. In most of the literature the 
variables chosen have been previously found to be significant. The starting point in this study 
are the predictor variables used by Perols (2011), which contained 42 variables. Here only 35 
of them are used, because the data for the other 7 variables was not available in Compustat. 
Why so many variables. Well as Perols pointed out a lot of other things, legitimate things, can 
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make the financial statement look similar to a fraudulent financial statement. With enough 
many variables one might be able to get fraud pop out somewhere as a combination of its 
effect on different variables. Perols gives the definitions of the variables and citations of 
publications where they were originally, but no theoretical reasoning for them. Next some 
theoretical reasoning is given for using the variables. In particular we try to give reasons for 
the signs of the coefficients.  
In principle the signs of all of the coefficients can be justified to be undetermined, because 
according to Perols (2011) fraud is being concealed, and according to Perols and Lougee 
(2011) fraud does not necessarily follow GAAPs. If one does not follow GAAP, one can put 
any transaction almost anywhere in accounting, so that the fraudulent part can appear 
anywhere in the financial statement, at least in principle. Therefore any sign, which one could 
think of based on any theory, could be changed to opposite, because fraud does not have to 
follow GAAP. In practise the violation of GAAP cannot be too obvious, like moving all the 
fraudulent transactions to another part of the financial statement in one big chunk. It is likely 
that auditors would find this. But moving everything piece by piece as part of something 
legitimate might well go undetected and the effect on financial statement is the same as 
moving it in one big chunk. As conclusion predicting signs based on theories, when dealing 
with fraud, may be futile. 
In the next subsection the possibility of changing signs due to fraud is not considered. The 
signs are determined based on any other theory if possible. If the sign turns out be different 
from the predicted one, the reason might be concealment of fraud or that the theory does not 
hold up. Fraud types might also have a different sign than fraud itself. This due to the 
competing  
 
2.2.1 Predictor variables 
 
Accounts receivable. This was used by Green and Choi (1997) and Lin et al. (2003). Green 
and Choi mentioned that this is relevant for risk assessment of revenue and collection cycle. 
Lin et al. reasoned that this is one of the most often used account trends in practise. Accounts 
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receivable has also been mentioned in auditing standards, ISA 805 attachment 1, IAASB 
(2018), concerning issues requiring special attention in financial statements. The risk is 
increased, when the accounts receivable increases, so the probability of fraud should increase 
at the same time. Therefore the predicted sign of the coefficient is (+). 
Accounts receivable to sales. This is defined as the ratio of accounts receivable and sales. 
The variable was used by Green and Choi (1997), Feroz et al. (2000), Lin et al. (2003) and 
Kaminski et al. (2004). Green and Choi actually had net sales to accounts receivable as their 
variable, their reasoning being the risk assessment of revenue and collection cycle. Feroz et al. 
use this for auditing red flag, more specifically difficult to audit transactions class. Lin et al. 
reasoned that this is one of most commonly used financial ratios in audit. It was also reported 
to be useful for financial statement misstatements. Kaminski et al. cite empirical evidence of 
prior studies, but they do not have theoretical reasoning. In ISA 240 attachment 3, IAASB 
(2018), the unusual changes in the financial ratios can indicate misconduct, especially changes 
of receivables compared to net sales. Both large accounts receivable and large sales are a 
source of risk. Therefore the ratio could go up or down and increase the probability of fraud, 
so the predicted sign of the coefficient is undetermined. 
Accounts receivable to total assets. This is the ratio of accounts receivable and total assets. 
This was used by Green and Choi (1997) and Lin et al. (2003). Green and Choi mentioned that 
this is relevant for risk assessment of revenue and collection cycle. Lin et al. reasoned that this 
is a comparative ratio, which is often used in the examination of accounts receivable. 
Accounts receivable is a riskier asset than some other assets, so if there are a high percentage 
of them of the total assets, the financial statement contains more risk. On the other hand total 
assets contain also other sources of risk like inventory, so again the ratio can go up or down 
and increase the probability of fraud.  
Allowance of doubtful accounts (AFDA). This is a reduction of accounts receivable, which 
represents the amount of receivables that managers believe will not be paid. This was used by 
Green and Choi (1997) and Lin et al. (2003). Green and Choi mentioned that this is relevant 
for risk assessment of revenue and collection cycle. Lin et al. reasoned that this is one of the 
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common trends used in the audit of the sales and receivables cycle. Since the effect of this is 
opposite to the accounts receivable, the predicted sign of the coefficient is (-). 
AFDA to accounts receivable. This is the ratio of AFDA and accounts receivable. This was 
used by Green and Choi (1997) and Lin et al. (2003). Green and Choi mentioned that this is 
relevant for risk assessment of revenue and collection cycle. Lin et al. reasoned that this 
measures the relationships between contra-account and applicable aggregate accounts. The 
bigger AFDA is compared to accounts receivable, the more riskiness of accounts receivable is 
reduced. Therefore one expects the probability of fraud to decrease with increasing AFDA to 
accounts receivable ratio. So the predicted sign of the coefficient is (-). 
AFDA to net sales. This is the ratio of AFDA and sales. This was used by Green and Choi 
(1997) and Lin et al. (2003). Green and Choi mentioned that this is relevant for risk 
assessment of revenue and collection cycle. Lin et al. reasoned that this measures the 
relationships between contra-account and applicable aggregate accounts. Risk is increased if 
net sales are increased. On the other hand risk is reduced with increasing AFDA, because it 
decreases the effect of accounts receivable. Therefore the behavior of ratio is undetermined. 
The predicted sign of the coefficient is not determined 
Altman Z-score. This is defined as follows by Perols (2011) 
 Altman Z-score
= [3,3
∙ (Income before extraordinary items
+ Total interest and related expenses + Total income taxes)
+ 0,999 ∙ Net sales + 1,2 ∙ Working capital + 1,4
∙ Retained earnings] / Total assets + 0,6
∙ Common shares outstanding
∙ Annual close price/ Total liabilities  
 
(1) 
 
This was used by Feroz et al. (2000), and Fanning and Cogger (1998). They used this as 
financial red flag for auditing, more specifically as an indicator of going concern or financial 
distress. Small values typically indicate that the company is headed for bankruptcy. Since 
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increase of bankruptcy risk may be connected to fraud, the probability of fraud increases with 
decreasing Altman Z-score. So the predicted sign of the coefficient is (-). 
Big 4 auditor. This variable is defined as “is the auditor one of the big 4 auditing firms”. This 
actually consists of 8 different auditing firms: Arthur Andersen, Arthur Young, Coopers & 
Lybrand, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG Peat Marwick, Pricewaterhousecoopers 
and Touche Ross. Originally the firms were the Big 8 and then in time they have dropped to 
Big 4 for various reasons. All of original big auditing firms are included in this variable. This 
was used by Fanning and Cogger (1998). They called it as big 6 auditor, because at the time 
there were still 6 of the 8 big auditing firms around. This is relevant variable, because the 
larger auditing firms have invested more reputational capital than smaller ones, so they have 
greater incentives to reduce errors. Moreover the possibility of losing an audit is not so big of 
an issue for the revenue of a larger firm. They may also be able to provide higher quality, 
because they have more resources and experience with different industries. The models used 
here are based on data, where fraud has been found. Since Big 4 auditors are more likely to 
find fraud, the predicted sign of the coefficient is (+). 
Current minus prior year inventory to sales. This is simply the difference of the ratios of 
inventory to sales in the current year and previous year 
 Current minus prior year inventory to sales
=
Inventory (current)
Net Sales (current)
−
Inventory (previous)
Net Sales (Previous)
 
(2) 
This was used by Summers and Sweeney (1998). They base it on auditing standards. Any 
account whose value requires subjective judgement increases audit risk. Inventory is such an 
account. Because of subjectivity the management may use it for financial statement 
manipulation. Large changes in inventory compared to sales are typically suspicious, so the 
sign of the coefficient is undetermined. 
Days in receivables index. Days in receivables is simply 365 times the accounts receivables 
over net sales. Days in receivables index is just the ratio of days in receivables in the current 
and previous year  
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 Days in receivables index
=
Account receivable (current) / Net sales (current)
Accounts receivable (previous) / Net sales (previous)
 
(3) 
This was used by Beneish (1997). He used it to measure whether accounts receivable is out of 
balance. A large increase in it may indicate that accounts receivable is inflated. Since the 
increase in accounts receivable likely increases the probability of fraud, the predicted sign of 
the coefficient is (+). 
Debt to equity. This is the ratio of total liabilities and equity. This was used by Fanning and 
Cogger (1998). Since research suggests that the potential for wealth transfers from debt 
holders to managers increases as leverage increases. The managers may manipulate financial 
statements to meet debt covenants. Therefore the more debt there is compared to equity the 
higher risk for fraud. Therefore the predicted sign of the coefficient is (+). 
Demand for financing (ex ante). This is a dummy variable, which is defined based on 
whether the following condition is true or not 
 Cash flow from op. activities − Mean capital expenditure in 3 previous years
Total current assets in previous year
< −0,5 
(4) 
 
If the condition in equation (4) is true, the value is 1, otherwise 0. This variable was created by 
Dechow et al. (1996) to show whether the firm requires external financing within the next two 
years (value = 1) or will the internal financing be sufficient for the next two years (value = 0). 
Dechow et al. used this variable in the study of earnings manipulation. As mentioned by 
Perols and Lougee (2011) the earnings management and fraud have the same purpose. Since 
the demand for financing increases the probability of fraud, the predicted sign of the 
coefficient is (+). 
Declining cash sales dummy. This is a dummy variable, which is defined based on the 
following condition 
 
Cash sales (current year) < Cash sales (previous year) (5) 
  
 
 
18 
 
Where cash sales is net sales minus receivables in the current year plus receivables in the 
previous year. If the condition in equation (5) is true, the value is 1, otherwise the value is 0. 
This was used by Beneish (1997). This is used by analysts to measure earnings quality. If cash 
sales decline, extra financing may be required. This on the hand increases the likelihood of 
manipulating earnings. Therefore the probability of fraud increases and the predicted sign of 
the coefficient is (+). 
Fixed assets to total assets. This is defined as the ratio of gross total of property, plant and 
equipment and the total assets. This was used by Kaminski et al. (2004). They cite earlier 
empirical studies as the basis. They do not have theoretical reasoning which they plainly say. 
Since there is no real reasoning for this, there is no reasoning for the sign of coefficient, so it is 
undetermined. 
Four year geometric sales growth rate. This is defined as follows 
 
Four year geometric growth rate = (
Net sales (current year)
Net sales (current -3 years)
)
1
4
− 1 (6) 
This was used by Fanning and Cogger (1998). They actually used geometric growth for the 
previous two years. Perols (2011) used the definition in equation (6). Reasoning of Fanning 
and Cogger is that continued growth is motivation for fraud. Rapid growth can also lead to a 
decrease in the effectiveness of internal controls making it easier to commit fraud. The higher 
this quantity is, the more likely is fraud, so the predicted sign of the coefficient is (+). 
Gross margin. This is defined as the difference of net sales and cost of goods sold, divided by 
net sales. This was used by Green and Choi (1997) and Lin et al. (2003). Green and Choi 
mention that this is used for risk assessment of the revenue and collection cycle. Lin et al. 
actually use this, because it is one of the most commonly used financial ratios in audit. 
Typically large changes are looked for in this quantity, so the predicted sign of the coefficient 
is undetermined. 
Holding period return in the violation period. This is defined as the difference of annual 
closing price in the current year and previous, divided by annual closing price in the current 
year. This was used by Beneish (1999). He uses this as one of the surrogates for an increased 
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likelihood that a firm is investigated and charged by the SEC. The larger the difference, the 
more likely that SEC investigates. Therefore the probability of fraud is increased with 
increasing difference, so the predicted sign of the coefficient is (+). 
Industry ROE minus firm ROE. This is defined as the name says, and the return on equity 
(ROE) defined as the ratio of net income and equity. This was used by Feroz et al. (2000). 
They use as financial red flag for audit, more specifically to measure profitability. If the ROE 
of the firm deviates a lot from the industry ROE, the probability of fraud is increased. If firm 
ROE is larger than industry ROE, it is possible that firm is committing fraud by increasing its 
revenues or decreasing its costs. If firm ROE is less than industry ROE, it may indicate 
financial distress, which is a reason for committing fraud. Therefore the sign of the coefficient 
is undetermined. 
Inventory to sales. This is the ratio of inventory and sales. This was used by Kaminski et al. 
(2004). They had no theoretical justification but based it on earlier empirical results. Both 
large inventories and sales contain risks. So it is unclear how this ratio affects the probability 
of fraud. Therefore the predicted sign of the coefficient is undetermined. 
Net sales. This the total revenue from sales. This was used by Green and Choi (1997) and Lin 
et al. (2003). Green and Choi mentioned that this is relevant for risk assessment of revenue 
and collection cycle. Lin et al. stated that this is one of the most often used account trends in 
practise. This was also reported to be the most effective for detecting misstatements in revenue 
cycle. According to ISA 240 attachment 3, IAASB (2018), this is one of the accounts to look 
for changes in trends for misconduct. The risks are increased with higher net sales, so the 
predicted sign of the coefficient is (+). 
Positive accruals dummy. This is a dummy variable, which is 1, if income before 
extraordinary items is larger than net cash flow from operating activities both in the current 
and previous year, otherwise it is 0. This was used by Beneish (1997). He points out that if 
managers have previously made income increasing accruals, they might attempt to avoid 
accrual reversals or run out of ways to increase earnings. Since having these accruals makes 
the financial statement more risky, the probability of fraud is increased with them. Therefore 
the predicted sign of the coefficient is (+). 
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Prior year ROA to total assets. The return on assets (ROA) is defined as net income divided 
by totals assets. The variable itself is the ratio ROA in the previous year and total assets in the 
current year. This was used by Summers and Sweeney (1998). They use ROA to measure 
financial performance. Since managers try to keep the financial performance the same or make 
it better, the larger the ratio, the larger the probability of fraud. Therefore the predicted sign of 
the coefficient is (+). 
Property, plant and equipment to total assets. This is the ratio of net total property, plant 
and equipment and total assets. This was used by Fanning and Cogger (1998). They tested 
several variables for their ability to predict fraud and this was one of them. They did not 
provide theoretical reasoning for this variable although most other times they did provide 
theoretical reasoning. It is unclear how this should affect the probability of fraud. On the one 
hand the valuation of property, plant and equipment could contain fraud, so the same fraud 
would be in total assets. In this case the ratio increases. On the other hand fraud could be in 
other parts of total assets, in which case the ratio decreases. So the sign of the coefficient is 
left undetermined. 
Sales to total assets. This the ratio of net sales and total assets. This was used by Fanning and 
Cogger (1998) and Kaminski et al. (2004). Like previous variable Fanning and Cogger tested 
this variable for its ability to predict fraud and mentioned that it had been previously observed 
to be significant. Sales is a variable that they mention is more likely to be manipulated by 
management. Due to two sided accounting the manipulation in sales has a corresponding item 
in the receivables and therefore the ratio is a useful variable to use. Kaminski et al. do not have 
theoretical reasoning, but they just cite empirical evidence from previous studies. High sales 
increase risk of fraud. On the other hand high total assets increase that risk, too. So the 
predicted sign of the coefficient is left undetermined. 
The number of auditor turnovers. This is defined as a sum of auditor turnover in the current 
year, previous year and 2
nd
 previous year. Auditor turnover in current year is 1, if auditor in 
the current year is different from the auditor in the previous year, otherwise 0. When the three 
turnover years are summed, the variable can have four different values: 0 (no auditor changes), 
1 (one auditor change in the past three years), 2 (two auditor changes in the past three years) 
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and 3 (auditor changed every time in the past three years). This was used by Feroz et al. 
(2000) as an audit oriented red flag. It seems reasonable that if there is a large turnover of 
auditors, the likelihood of fraud increases, because presumably the auditor is changed in order 
to conceal fraud. However, turnover might also be due to other reasons like client not paying 
his bills and auditor gets changed for that reason. The more there is auditor turnover, the more 
likely it is that there is fraud, too. So the predicted sign of the coefficient is (+). 
Times interest earned. This is the sum of total interest and related expenses, income before 
extraordinary items and total income taxes, divided by the total interest and related expenses. 
This was used by Feroz et al. (2000) as auditing red flag, more specifically indicating 
sensitivity to interest rates. There could be problems with any of the items that form this 
quantity. Therefore the predicted sign of the coefficient is undetermined. 
Total accruals to total assets. This is the difference of income before extraordinary items and 
net cash flow from operating activities, divided by total assets. This was used by Beneish 
(1997), Dechow et al. (1996) and Beneish (1999). Beneish uses this variable to capture how 
much of accounting earnings is cash based. Firms violating GAAP tend to have larger 
accruals. Dechow et al. use only the accruals for detecting earnings management. Since larger 
accruals contain more risk, the probability of fraud is increased with large accruals. Therefore 
the predicted sign of the coefficient is (+). 
Total debt to total assets. This is the ratio of total liabilities and total assets. This was used by 
Dechow et al. (1996). They use this as a proxy for the closeness of debt covenants in studying 
earnings management. Covenants can trigger the payment of the debt. Therefore the larger the 
debt, the larger the risk of earnings management and fraud. So the predicted sign of the 
coefficient is (+). 
Total discretionary accruals. Total discretionary accruals in the current year are defined as 
 
Total discretionary accruals = 𝐷𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝐴𝑡−2 + 𝐷𝐴𝑡−3 (7) 
 
𝐷𝐴𝑡 =
𝑇𝐴𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
− 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡 
(8) 
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 𝑇𝐴𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
=
Income before extraordinary items𝑡 − net cash flow from operating activities𝑡
Total assets𝑡−1
 
 
 
(9) 
 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡 = (1 + Sales in the current year − Sales in the previous year
− Receivables in the current year
+ Receivables in the previous year
+ Net cash flow from opearating activities in the current year
− Net cash flow form operating activities in the previous year
+ Gross total property, plant and equipment in the current year)
/ Total assets in the previous year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(10) 
This was used by Perols and Lougee (2011). They used this to capture the pressure of earnings 
reversals and earnings management limitations. This is the part of the accruals that the 
management can use for the earnings management. The larger the total discretionary accruals, 
the more likely is the earnings management and with it fraud. So the predicted sign of the 
coefficient is (+). 
Whether accounts receivable > 1,1 * of last year’s accounts receivable. This is a dummy 
variable, which is 1 if the condition in the name is true, otherwise it is 0. This was used by 
Fanning and Cogger (1998). Earlier work in trend analysis has established that auditors and 
analysts use 10% change as a threshold for material change in accounts or ratios according to 
them. This is also mentioned in ISA 240 attachment 3, IAASB (2018), as an example of 
potential misconduct. Increase in accounts receivable is connected to the increased probability 
of fraud. So the predicted sign of the coefficient is (+). 
Whether gross margin percent  > 1,1 * of last year’s gross margin percent. This is a 
dummy variable, which is 1 if the condition in the name is true, otherwise 0. This was used by 
Fanning and Cogger (1998). Earlier work in trend analysis has established that auditors and 
analysts use 10% change as a threshold for material change in accounts or ratios, according to 
them. This is the reasoning as with the change in account receivable in the previous variable. 
Therefore in the same way the predicted sign of the coefficient is (+). 
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Whether new securities were issued. This is a dummy variable, which is 1, if common 
shares outstanding in the current year is greater than common shares outstanding in the 
previous year or common shares issued in the current year is greater than 0, or both, otherwise 
the binary variable is 0. This was used by Dechow et al. (1996). They use this variable to 
measure the demand for external financing, when earnings have already been manipulated. 
Demand for external financing is related to the increased probability of fraud. So the predicted 
sign of the coefficient is (+). 
Whether Standard Industry Classification Code larger than 2999 and smaller than 4000. 
This is a binary variable, which is 1, if standard industry classification code is in the range 
mentioned in the name, otherwise it is 0. This was used by Lee et al. (1999). They provided 
descriptive statistics, which showed that with firms having SIC in the range 3000 – 3999 the 
fraud percentage was larger than with firms outside it. No theoretical reasoning was given for 
this. They obtained better results using this indicator variable than using separate dummy 
variables for the two digit SIC groups. Since the range is riskier, the predicted sign of the 
coefficient is (+). 
Value of Issued Securities to Market Value. This is defined as the market value of common 
shares issued divided by the market value of common shares outstanding, if there are common 
shares issued. If common shares are not issued, then if there are more common shares 
outstanding in the current year than in the previous year, the variable is the difference of 
market values of common shares outstanding in the current and previous year, divided by the 
market value of common shares outstanding in the current year. If both previous conditions  
fail, meaning no common shares were issued and the number of common shares does not 
change between previous and current year, then the value of the variable is 0. This was used 
by Dechow et al. (1996). They used this for earnings management in order measure the need 
for external financing while the earnings management is ongoing. This is the corresponding 
real variable to the dummy whether new securities are issued. The more financing is needed, 
the more value should the issued securities have. Therefore the probability of fraud should 
increase with increasing value of issued securities, so the predicted sign of the coefficient is 
(+). 
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Unexpected Employee Productivity. This is defined as the employee productivity in the firm 
minus the average employee productivity in the industry, where the employee productivity is 
defined as follows 
 Employee productivity
=
Net sales (current)
Number of employees (current)
−
Net sales (previous)
Number of employees (previous)
Net sales (current)
Number of employees (current)
 
(11) 
This was used by Perols and Lougee (2011). They used it to identify unusual relations between 
revenue and the number of employees. Large deviation from industry average is unusual. 
Since large deviation can occur in both directions, the predicted sign of the coefficient is 
undetermined. 
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3. Data and Methods 
The third chapter of this study outlines the research methods and data used in creating answers 
to the research questions.  
 
3.1 Logistic regression as the method of fraud classification 
The task at hand is to classify whether an observation is fraud or not. This is a binary task 
where the dependent variable y is 
 
𝑦 = {
1,                      𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑
 (12) 
The logistic model is used to produce predictions ?̂? from variables 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑚 with 
parameters 𝛽0, 𝛽1, … , 𝛽𝑚, see p. 575 in Wooldridge (2009). The logistic function produces a 
probability 
 𝑝(𝑦 = 1|𝒙) = 𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑚𝑥𝑚) 
𝑝(𝑦 = 0|𝒙) = 1 − 𝑝(𝑦 = 1|𝒙) 
𝐺(𝑧) =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝑧
 
(13) 
The logistic function G maps the usual linear regression result to the interval [0, 1] making it 
possible to interpret as probability. The prediction of the model is 
 
?̂? = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝(𝑦 = 1|𝒙) > 0.5
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝(𝑦 = 1|𝒙) ≤ 0.5
 (14) 
The usual method for solving the parameters is the maximum likelihood estimation where the 
log-likelihood function is maximized 
 
𝐿(𝜷) =∑𝑦𝑖 log(𝐺(𝑧𝑖)) + (1 − 𝑦𝑖) log(1 − 𝐺(𝑧𝑖))
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
𝑧𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1,𝑖 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑚𝑥𝑚,𝑖 
(15) 
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However, the number of variables here is so much that the model easily overfits and there 
might be multi-collinearity issues with the model. In order to reduce these and to get a better 
generalization error a regularization term is added and the objective function to be used in the 
optimization is 
 
𝐽(𝜷) = −𝐿(𝜷) +
𝜆
2
|𝜷|2, 𝜷 = (𝛽0, 𝛽1, … , 𝛽𝑝) (16) 
Since the likelihood term is preceded by a negative sign the objective function is minimized to 
find the optimal solution. Chapter 7 in Goodfellow et al. (2016) deals with issues of 
regularization. The regularization chosen here is of the simplest type. In the book by 
Goodfellow et al. there are more choices presented, like absolute values of coefficients are 
taken instead of squared values. The squared values have better mathematical behaviour, so 
they are used here. Many times the coefficient of the intercept, β0, is not included in the 
regularization term. 
The addition of regularization has two effects: it keeps coefficients smaller because it 
penalizes the high values of the coefficients (note intercept term is not being penalized) and it 
reduces effects of multi-collinearity. The latter effect can be seen by forming the covariance 
matrix which is just the inverse of the information matrix, which is just the Hessian matrix of 
the negative likelihood. For logistic regression the covariance matrix is 
 
𝐼(𝜷)𝑖𝑗 = −
𝜕2𝐿(𝜷)
𝜕𝛽𝑖 𝜕𝛽𝑗
, 𝜷 = (𝛽0, 𝛽1,⋯ , 𝛽𝑝) 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜷) =  𝐼(𝜷)−1 
 
(17) 
For logistic regression the information matrix has been calculated in p. 35 of Hosmer and 
Lemeshow (2000) 
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𝑋 =
(
 
1 𝑥11 ⋯ 𝑥𝑝1
1 𝑥12 ⋯ 𝑥𝑝2
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
1 𝑥1𝑛 ⋯ 𝑥𝑝𝑛)
  
 
𝑉 = (
?̂?1(1 − ?̂?1) 0 ⋯ 0
0 ?̂?2(1 − ?̂?2) ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 0 ⋯ ?̂?𝑛(1 − ?̂?𝑛)
) 
 
𝐼(𝜷) = 𝑋𝑇𝑉𝑋 
 
(18) 
where ?̂?𝑖 is the estimated probability of case i. Since for covariance the information matrix I 
has to be inverted, the matrix has to be invertible. If there are collinearities between variables, 
then the matrix may well fail to be invertible. The problem persists even when the lowest 
eigenvalue of the information matrix is close to 0. Without matrix V the information matrix 
would match the one in linear regression. With the addition of the regularization term the 
information matrix
5
 becomes 
 
𝐼(𝜷) = 𝑋𝑇𝑉𝑋 +  𝜆 𝟙 (19) 
Since the first part of the information matrix is positive definite and symmetric and λ > 0, the 
eigenvalues of the information matrix have a lower bound 
 
𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠(𝐼) ≥  𝜆 (20) 
which guarantees the invertibility of the information matrix and the covariance matrix now 
exists and thus the multi-collinearity issue is reduced. However, the regularization term λ can 
be small and in this case the multi-collinearity might again become an issue, just like in linear 
regression it is not required that there is perfect collinearity but rather a strong correlation 
between variables. Therefore the regularization cannot be too small, so that one does not run 
into numerical instability. 
                                                          
5
 This is no longer an actual information matrix, because with regularization equation (16) is no longer an actual 
likelihood function. 
  
 
 
28 
 
Unfortunately maximizing the likelihood in equation (15) or minimizing the regularized 
likelihood in equation (16) do not have closed form solutions, so one has to resort to numerical 
methods. A typical method is Newton-Rhapson, which results into estimators for the 
coefficients, see for example section 5 in van Wieringen (2015) how to do this. From section 
5.3 of van Wieringen we get also the covariance and bias of the estimator 
 𝐸(𝜷𝒏𝒆𝒘) = (𝑋
𝑇𝑊𝑋 + 𝜆𝟙)−1(𝑋𝑇𝑊𝑋𝜷𝒐𝒍𝒅 + 𝑋
𝑇(𝐸(𝒚) − 𝝅𝒐𝒍𝒅)) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜷𝒏𝒆𝒘) = (𝑋
𝑇𝑊𝑋 + 𝜆𝟙)−1 𝑋𝑇𝑊𝑋 (𝑋𝑇𝑊𝑋 + 𝜆𝟙)−1 
(21) 
where the subscripts new and old refer to the Newton-Rhapson iterative algorithm, in which a 
new value is calculated based on the old one. The bias depends on the old coefficients directly, 
whereas the variance depends on the old coefficients only through the estimated probabilities 
in the matrix W. Although the regularization solves multicollinearity, the estimator is biased. 
Furthermore the bias actually depends on the actual coefficients, not the estimated ones, but 
we do not know the actual ones. The bias can be estimated using the estimated coefficients. As 
can be seen the variance goes down with increasing regularization parameter, this can also be 
seen in Figure 5.2 of van Wieringen (2015).  
Another way to get rid of multicollinearity would be to remove the variables suffering from 
collinearity issues. Since the interest here is the prediction of fraud or fraud type, which means 
that fraud or fraud type is the dependent variable, not the independent one, the problem of 
collinearity is not so serious. If the interest were to explain the fraud or fraud type with 
particular variables, the approach to throw away the collinear variables would be better. But 
the main question is whether a financial statement is predicted to be fraudulent or not. Since 
the question is about the dependent variable, it can be answered even with perfectly collinear 
variables. Namely the coefficient can be estimated with suitable methods, which do not rely on 
inverting the singular covariance matrix, such as gradient descent, see chapter 4 in Goodfellow 
et al. (2016). With perfectly collinear variables without regularization the actual estimate 
would be an estimate of a sum of the coefficients of the collinear variables. A numerical 
method would find an estimate for the two coefficients such that their sum would equal the 
actual estimate. The numerical method could arrive in any possible combination, where the 
sum of the coefficients equals the actual estimate, at least within numerical accuracy of the 
computation. Whichever of these combinations is used is inconsequential for the dependent 
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variable, which only sees the effect of the sum of the coefficients of the perfectly collinear 
variables. So it is uniquely defined even with collinear variables. And its statistics is the one of 
binary variables in the end. The problem arises, if one wishes to ask how much each variable 
contributes to the dependent variable. And how significant are the coefficients. The 
regularization is just another way of doing the analysis with the collinear variables, where the 
regularization causes a unique choice of a combination of the coefficients, but introduces a bit 
of bias along the way. The conclusion is that even with collinear variables questions about the 
dependent variable can be handled. 
 
3.2 Training and testing sets 
Typically in machine learning one uses training and testing sets, chapter 5 in Goodfellow et al. 
(2016). Idea is that the model is developed and optimized on the training set and then the 
results, that presumably generalize to new data, are estimated based on test set. The way to 
define the training and test sets is random sampling to the two sets. There are no exact rules on 
how big the divisions should be but typically the training set takes 70-80% of the data and test 
set is left with the rest 20-30%. One may also have to use stratified sampling, if the classes are 
imbalanced. Essentially the data is divided in the following manner 
Figure 1 Training and test set partition 
 
Training Test 
 
However, there is not always enough data for having training and test sets. Then one can use 
cross-validation where one divides the data into k separate parts, called folds, and the kth fold 
is used as a test set and the folds 1, …, k-1 are used as a training set where a model is fitted, 
then the (k-1)th fold is used as test set and the other k-1 folds as training set where another 
model is fitted, etc. After this has been repeated k times the results are then averaged over the 
folds. This way all the data is used and nothing is wasted but nevertheless training and test sets 
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do not overlap per fold. This is called k-fold cross-validation. Below is an example of 3-fold 
cross-validation 
Figure 2 Example: 3-fold cross validation 
 
1. Fold Training Test 
2. Fold Training Test Training 
3. Fold Test Training 
 
so at every fold 2/3 of data is used for training and 1/3 for testing. Since the data set is 
imbalanced, before fitting the training data is balanced by replicating the minority class. Perols 
(2011) did the balancing using undersampling on the non-fraud data and in Perols et al. (2017) 
the undersampling was done in much more sophisticated ways, that improved the results of 
Perols (2011) considerably. In Dutta et al. (2017) the balancing was done using SMOTE 
algorithm, which oversamples the fraud data and creates new samples, which are not exact 
replicas of the old ones. 
 
3.3 Performance measures 
The problem with unbalanced samples is that the accuracy is not necessarily a good measure 
of performance. With binary classification there are 4 possibilities: true positives model 
predicts fraud when fraud is present, false positives model predicts fraud when it is not fraud, 
true negatives model predicts non-fraud when it is not fraud and false negatives model predicts 
non-fraud when it is fraud. This is contained in the following table 
Table 1 Confusion matrix 
 
 Actual fraud Actual non-fraud 
Model predicts fraud True positives (TP) False positives (FP) 
Model predicts non-fraud False negatives (FN) True negatives (TN) 
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Here the false negatives are the problem, because the costs of misclassifying them are much 
higher than the costs related false positives. Usual performance measures for this table are 
 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑁
 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃
 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃
 
(22) 
 
Accuracy tells the probability of predicting correctly over all observations. Precision tells the 
probability of predicting fraud correctly among all the cases where the classifier predicted 
fraud, so how often is the fraud classification correct. Sensitivity tells the probability of the 
model of finding fraud among all the fraud cases. Specificity is for non-fraud the analogue of 
what sensitivity is for fraud, namely it tells the probability of model finding non-fraud among 
all the cases of non-fraud. On top of these quantities one can define many more. Also there are 
other names for these quantities, too. See for example the web-page about Precision and 
Recall (2019), which contains a thorough list of the different performance measures and the 
different names for them. 
The standard errors for these quantities can be calculated as 
 
𝑠. 𝑒. (𝑃𝑀) = √
1
𝑁
𝑃𝑀 (1 − 𝑃𝑀) (23) 
where PM is any one of the above defined performance measures and N is the number of cases 
in the whole class for the performance measure 
 
𝑁 = {
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑁, 𝑃𝑀 = 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃, 𝑃𝑀 = 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁, 𝑃𝑀 = 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃, 𝑃𝑀 = 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
 (24) 
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Which performance measure should one use? There is no simple answer to this. One has to 
look at them in combination, since the performance measures describe different aspects of the 
classifier. One might think that accuracy is the most important performance measure. 
However, since we are more interested in getting the fraud cases predicted, the precision is the 
more interesting measure of performance. As an example let us suppose that there are 1% of 
fraud cases. Then one can easily have a classifier that is 99% accurate, just predict everything 
to be non-fraud. This results into TP = FP = 0, FN = 0,01 * Total and TN = 0,99 * Total. 
Putting into the equation for accuracy the result is 0,99. However, 0 fraud cases are observed 
with this classifier. If the purpose is to find fraud the 99% accuracy of the classifier meant 
nothing. This does not mean that accuracy is not important but rather that all the performance 
measures have to be looked at. On the other hand if everything is predicted to be fraud, then 
FN = TN = 0 and sensitivity = 1, specificity = 0, accuracy = precision would be small since 
the number of frauds is typically much smaller than number non-frauds TP << FP. 
All the performance measures that have so far been defined are made for just single threshold 
probability of classification, which so far has been taken to be 0.5. However, it may be useful 
use a different threshold, like if one wants to find more fraud and is willing to sacrifice 
accuracy for it, the threshold may be dropped below 0.5. With a new threshold probability all 
the quantities above would have to be recalculated. There would have to be values for all 
different threshold probabilities. This is not practical. Therefore another tool is used for the 
changing threshold probability: a graphical device called a Receiver Operating Characteristic 
(ROC) curve where 1-Specificity vs. Sensitivity are drawn into the same figure while 
changing the threshold probability p0 
 
?̂? = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝(𝑦 = 1|𝒙) > 𝑝0
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝(𝑦 = 1|𝒙) ≤ 𝑝0
 (25) 
 
As an example let us produce ROC curve for coin toss or random choice. For every value of p0 
there are TP + FN fraud samples and FP + TN non-fraud samples. If the choice is truly 
random then predicted numbers will be split in fraud and non-fraud samples on threshold 
probability ratio 
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 𝑇𝑃 = (1 − 𝑝0)(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁) 
𝐹𝑁 = 𝑝0 (𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁) 
𝐹𝑃 = (1 − 𝑝0)(𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁) 
𝑇𝑁 = 𝑝0 (𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁) 
(26) 
 
Now we can form the sensitivity and specificity 
 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
= 1 − 𝑝0 
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃
= 𝑝0 
1 − 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 1 − 𝑝0 
(27) 
The ROC curve traces out a curve (1-p0, 1-p0) when 0 ≤ p0 ≤ 1. This is just a straight line 
starting from (1, 1) and ending to (0, 0). A perfect classifier would have FP = FN = 0, so that 
the ROC curve shrinks to a point (0, 1). In general a classifier traces a curve between (1, 1) 
and (0, 0). The classifier performs better than another if it is above and to the left of the other 
one. 
A performance measure related to the ROC curve is the Area Under the Curve (AUC). This is 
just the area between the ROC curve and the horizontal axis. For random choice this is 0.5 
(area of the triangle with sides 1). Typically a classifier has to beat this number in order to be 
of any value. Standard error for AUC can be calculated as, see Hanley and McNeil (1982), 
 𝑠. 𝑒. (𝐴𝑈𝐶)
= √
𝐴𝑈𝐶 (1 − 𝐴𝑈𝐶) + (𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 − 1)(𝑄1 − 𝐴𝑈𝐶2) + (𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 − 1)(𝑄2 − 𝐴𝑈𝐶2)
𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑
 
𝑄1 =
𝐴𝑈𝐶
2 − 𝐴𝑈𝐶
 
𝑄2 =
2 𝐴𝑈𝐶2
1 + 𝐴𝑈𝐶
 
(28) 
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The assumption in Hanley-McNeil formula for standard error is that the two classes, here 
fraud and non-fraud, are both normally distributed. This may well be a reasonable assumption, 
if there are a lot cases in both classes, but here the number of fraud cases is typically small. 
Since there are not much better solutions for standard error of AUC, the above formula is used 
for it. Any kind of inferences based on this formula have to be taken with the caveat, that class 
of fraud may not be normally distributed due to small number of cases. This may make the 
inference unreliable. 
All the performance measures so far do not take into account the cost of misclassifying fraud. 
Typically the cost of misclassifying fraud as non-fraud is much higher than the cost of 
misclassifying non-fraud as fraud. Therefore in Perols (2011) expected cost of 
misclassification is presented, which has originally been used by Dopuch et al. (1987) for 
predicting audit qualifications. Their formula can be derived by assuming a joint probability 
distribution of predictions and actual cases of fraud. That probability distribution has an 
expected value 
 𝐸𝑅𝐶 = 𝐸(𝐶) = 𝐶𝑓,𝑓 𝑃(𝑓, 𝑓) + 𝐶𝑛𝑓,𝑓 𝑃(𝑛𝑓, 𝑓) + 𝐶𝑓,𝑛𝑓 𝑃(𝑓, 𝑛𝑓)
+ 𝐶𝑛𝑓,𝑛𝑓 𝑃(𝑛𝑓, 𝑛𝑓) 
(29) 
where P(i, j) is the probability of predicting i when actual condition is j and i, j = f, nf with f = 
fraud and nf = non-fraud, Ci,j is the extra cost of predicting i when the condition is j. If the 
prediction equals the actual condition there is no extra cost involved, so 
 𝐶𝑓,𝑓 = 𝐶𝑛𝑓,𝑛𝑓 = 0 
𝐶𝑛𝑓,𝑓 = 𝐶𝐹𝑁 , 𝐶𝑓,𝑛𝑓 = 𝐶𝐹𝑃 
(30) 
The expected relative cost becomes 
 𝐸𝑅𝐶 = 𝐶𝐹𝑁 𝑃(𝑛𝑓, 𝑓) + 𝐶𝐹𝑃 𝑃(𝑓, 𝑛𝑓)
= 𝐶𝐹𝑁  
𝑃(𝑛𝑓, 𝑓)
𝑃(𝑓)
 𝑃(𝑓) + 𝐶𝐹𝑃  
𝑃(𝑓, 𝑛𝑓)
𝑃(𝑛𝑓)
 𝑃(𝑛𝑓) 
(31) 
where P(i) refers to the probability of actual condition being i. The ratios of probabilities can 
be estimated with the frequencies of the model, which are evaluated by 
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 𝑃(𝑛𝑓, 𝑓)
𝑃(𝑓)
=
𝐹𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 
𝑃(𝑓, 𝑛𝑓)
𝑃(𝑛𝑓)
=
𝐹𝑃
𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
 
(32) 
Putting the results of equation (31) into equation (30), we get the result, which has been 
presented by Perols (2011) and Dopuch et al. (1987) 
 
𝐸𝑅𝐶 =
𝐹𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 𝐶𝐹𝑁 𝑃(𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑) +
𝐹𝑃
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃
 𝐶𝐹𝑃 𝑃(𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑) (33) 
where CFN is the cost of classifying fraud as non-fraud and CFP the cost of classifying non-
fraud as fraud, P(fraud) is the prior fraud probability that exists at evaluation time (should be 
the real probability of fraud) and P(non-fraud) the prior probability of non-fraud. It is expected 
that CFN >> CFP and P(fraud) << P(non-fraud). Trouble is that these quantities are not known 
and are hard to estimate. Therefore one typically estimates equation (32) with different values 
of prior fraud probability and different ratios of CFP / CFN leaving either of the costs 
undetermined. 
Expected relative cost is calculated for the fraud prediction only, not for fraud type prediction. 
The reason is that with fraud type prediction there can be more general types of errors. If the 
model predicts fraud type, the actual situation can be that the fraud type was predicted 
correctly. But if it is not correct, there are two types of mistakes here now: it is actually non-
fraud so it is not of any fraud type, it is actually fraud but of different type than what the 
model was predicting. Second if the model predicts not of this fraud type, there are now three 
situations: condition is actually non-fraud so it is not of any fraud type and prediction is 
correct, condition is actually not of this fraud type but is in reality fraud of other type, and last 
the condition is actually this fraud type so the prediction was not correct. If the cost of false 
positives and false negatives is equal, then one could just put the same cost for everything and 
one could easily use the above formula for the expected relative costs. However, if they are 
different and usually the cost of false negatives, predicting fraud as non-fraud, is much higher 
than the cost of false positives, predicting non-fraud as fraud, it seems that using fraud type 
prediction cost of false negatives for the case of predicting not of this fraud type when the case 
is of different fraud type than what is being looked for in the model. This issue is not raised in 
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Perols et al. (2017) but rather they use the same expected relative cost as with just fraud 
prediction. 
 
3.4 Data 
The data is obtained from WRDS in two parts: one part from Compustat taking financial 
announcements from the period 1.1.1991 – 31.12.2016 and the other part from Audit 
Analytics taking restatements from the period 1.1.1995 – 9.5.2019 (all the data obtainable).6 
The datasets are combined per Company Identity Key and the financial period. Restatements 
can be given for much longer periods than the financial period, for example one of the fraud 
examples has restatement for period 1.1.2001 – 31.12.2004 meaning that all the 4 years of 
financial statements contain fraud. The matching is made in such a way that Company Identity 
Keys have to match and the financial period of the financial statement has to be contained in 
restatement period meaning 
 Restatement company identity key = Financial statement company identity key 
 Restatement end date ≥ Financial statement begin date 
 Restatement begin date ≤ Financial statement end date 
(34) 
 
If the above conditions hold, then the financial statement is marked fraudulent using a dummy 
variable with value 1 for fraud, otherwise it is not fraudulent with value 0. If it is fraudulent, 
also its types are marked using their own dummy variables.
7
 
The dummy variables describing fraud and its types are named according to the key number. 
The names can be found in table 3 for the fraud categories used here. Altogether Audit 
Analytics data contained 42 categories of fraud and 301 cases of fraud in the beginning. 
                                                          
6
 The reason in the difference of time periods is that Audit Analytics has data from 1.1.1995 onwards and some 
of the variables used require financial data from 4 previous years, so Compustat data is taken from 1.1.1991 to 
take this into account. Second the restatements are really given only afterwards, so the financial statement data 
has to be restricted to some latest date, which was chosen here to be 31.12.2016. 
7
 One restatement can contain several fraud types. One dummy variable per fraud type is added. 
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From Compustat financial data 35 variables used to predict fraud are formed that were defined 
in section 3.2.1. These are the same as used Perols (2011) minus the 8 variables that could not 
be defined. Next table contains all the 35 variables used in this thesis. The first column 
contains the number with which to identify the fraud predictor, the second column the actual 
name and the third column the definition in terms of Compustat variables. 
Table 2 Prediction variables, t refers to the end date of financial period, t-1 to the end date of 
previous financial period, and so on. 
 
Number Name Definition using  
Compustat variables 
1 Accounts receivable RECTt 
2 Accounts receivable to sales RECTt / SALEt 
3 Accounts receivable to total 
assets 
RECTt / ATt 
4 Allowance of doubtful 
accounts (AFDA) 
RECDt 
5 AFDA to accounts receivable RECDt / RECTt 
6 AFDA to net sales RECDt / SALEt 
7 Altman Z-score 3,3 * (IBt + XINTt + TXTt) / ATt + (0,999 
* SALEt + 1,2 * WCAPt + 1,4 * REt) / ATt 
+ 0,6 * CSHOt * PRCCt / LTt 
8 Big 4 auditor IF 0 < AUt < 9 THEN 1 ELSE 0 
9 Current minus prior year 
inventory to sales 
INVTt / SALEt – INVTt-1 / SALEt-1 
10 Days in receivables index (RECTt / RECTt-1) * (SALEt-1 / SALEt) 
11 Debt to equity LTt / CEQt 
12 Demand for financing (ex 
ante) 
IF (OANCFt – (CAPXt-3 + CAPXt-2 + 
CAPXt-1) / 3) / ACTt-1 < -0,5 THEN 1 
ELSE 0 
13 Declining cash sales dummy IF (SALEt – RECTt + RECTt-1) < (SALEt-1 
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– RECTt-1 + RECTt-2) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
14 Fixed assets to total assets PPEGTt / ATt 
15 Four year geometric sales 
growth rate 
(SALEt / SALEt-3)
1/4
 – 1 
16 Gross margin 1 – COGSt / SALEt 
17 Holding period return in the 
violation period 
1 – PRCCt-1 / PRCCt 
18 Industry ROE minus firm ROE INDUSTRY(NIt / CEQt) – FIRM(NIt / 
CEQt) 
19 Inventory to sales INVTt / SALEt 
20 Net sales SALEt 
21 Positive accruals dummy IF ((IBt – OANCFt) > 0 AND (IBt-1 – 
OANCFt-1) > 0)) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
22 Prior year ROA to total assets (NIt-1 / ATt-1)/ ATt 
23 Property, plant and equipment 
to total assets 
PPENTt / ATt 
24 Sales to total assets SALEt / ATt 
25 The number of auditor 
turnovers 
IF AUt ≠ AUt-I THEN 1 ELSE 0 + IF AUt-1 
≠ AUt-2 THEN 1 ELSE 0 + IF AUt-2 ≠ AUt-
3 THEN 1 ELSE 0 
26 Times interest earned 1 + (IBt + TXTt) / XINTt 
27 Total accruals to total assets (IBt – OANCFt) / ATt 
28 Total debt to total assets LTt / ATt 
29 Total discretionary accruals DAt-1 + DAt-2 + DAt-3 where DAt = TAt / 
At – estimated(NDAt) 
TAt / At = (IBt – OANCFt) / ATt-1 
NDAt = (1 + SALEt – SALEt-1 – RECTt + 
RECTt-1 + OANCFt – OANCFt-1 + 
PPEGTt) / ATt-1  
30 Whether accounts receivable > IF (RECTt / RECTt-1) > 1,1 THEN 1 ELSE 
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1,1 * of last year’s accounts 
receivable 
0 
31 Whether gross margin percent  
> 1,1 * of last year’s gross 
margin percent 
IF (1 – COGSt / SALEt) / (1 – COGSt-1 / 
SALEt-1) > 1,1 THEN 1 ELSE 0 
32 Whether new securities were 
issued 
IF (CSHOt – CSHOt-1) > 0 OR CSHIt > 0 
THEN 1 ELSE 0 
33 Whether Standard Industry 
Classification Code larger than 
2999 and smaller than 4000 
IF SICt > 2999 AND SICt < 4000 THEN 1 
ELSE 0 
34 Value of Issued Securities to 
Market Value 
IF (CSHIt > 0) THEN (CSHIt / CSHOt) 
ELSE IF (CSHOt – CSHOt-1 > 0) THEN (1 
– CSHOt-1 / CSHOt) ELSE 0 
35 Unexpected Employee 
Productivity 
FIRM((SALEt / SALEt-1) * (EMPt-1 / 
EMPt) – 1) – INDUSTRY(((SALEt / 
SALEt-1) * (EMPt-1 / EMPt) – 1) 
 
Once the variables are formed, all the cases with missing values are deleted and the data is 
restricted to cases whose financial period starts at 1.1.1995 or later. The continuous variables 
contain some extreme values. These are dealt with by applying winsorization, where the 
bottom 1% of values are set to 1 percentile value and the top 1% of values are set to 99 
percentile value. Dummy variables and variable 25 (auditor turnover) were not winsorized. 
Winsorization was also used by Dutta et al. (2017). 
Variables 18 and 35 contain industry average. These are calculated per year and per standard 
industry classification code (SIC). Once they are calculated the final variable values are 
calculated. The variables are named according to the number in the above table. The original 
Compustat dataset contained 260282 cases. After the variables are formed there are 59239 
cases left. 
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After the variables are formed the Audit Analytics and Compustat datasets are combined into 
one per Company Identity Code and financial period. The resulting sample has 347 cases of 
fraud and 58892 non-fraud cases. Thus 0,59% of cases contain fraud. In comparison Perols 
(2011) had fraud in 0,32% of cases. The amount of fraud cases with Perols was 51 in the final 
sample with 15934 non-fraud cases. Perols studied only years from the fourth quarter of 1998 
to the fourth quarter of 2005 and his data source did not include Audit Analytics but used 
SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases as a source of identifying fraud cases. 
Furthermore he had 43 prediction variables compared to the 35 here, which have more 
possibilities of containing missing data. Another benchmark is the misstatement research done 
by Dutta et al. (2017). Fraud is one part there and their study contains 109 cases of fraud 
among 3513 cases of misstatements with 60720 non-restatement cases. This seems to be far 
off. However they start from 260 cases of fraud covering years 1995-2014 in the Audit 
Analytics dataset (I tried with the time period and got 269 cases, so some new ones have 
appeared). They further restrict to the years 2001-2014 and they have 112 variables in their 
study because they study misstatements and not just fraud study, the same choice is made by 
Perols (2011). Another difference is that Dutta et al. keep only one restatement year per 
restatement case, same was done by Hennes et al. (2014), in order to reduce firm-level effects. 
This is not possible to do here because the amount of fraud types would drop so low that any 
kind of analysis with them becomes useless and in the study of misstatements there are many 
more cases available than for fraud. Perols et al. (2017) likely get away with the problem of 
having fewer fraud types, because of the sophisticated undersampling that they are using. 
Taking into account the reduced time period, this study contains 1995 – 04/2019 restatements 
in Audit Analytics dataset, and the many more variables that can contain missing values 
whose cases are deleted, the numbers are not really that far off. 
Next some of the fraud categories are combined into one because they contain too few cases to 
be of use. The ones with over 70 observations in the type category are kept, the rest are 
combined into a common category called Other. The following table describes the fraud type 
categories present in the final sample 
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Table 3 Fraud types 
 
Category key Frequency Category title 
6 137 Revenue recognition issues 
7 74 Expense (payroll, SGA, other) recording issues 
11 132 Foreign, related party, affiliated, or subsidiary issues 
12 99 Liabilities, payables, reserves and accrual estimate 
failures 
14 96 Accounts/loans receivable, investments & cash issues 
20 94 Inventory, vendor and/or cost of sales issues 
44 94 Foreign, subsidiary only issues (subcategory) 
Other 138 All the other categories that are not listed above 
combined into here 
Fraud 347  
 
The original Audit Analytics dataset on restatements contained 301 fraud cases. Here the 
number is 347. This happens because one restatement can contain several years i.e. more than 
one financial period. For example some restatements covered four years which could lead to 
possibly 4 or 5 financial statements containing fraud depending on how the financial statement 
periods compared to the restatement period, restatement might start in the middle of the first 
year and end in the middle of the 5th year thus affecting 5 financial statements. 
It is also of interest to see how the fraud types are distributed through financial periods 
Table 4 Fraud cases and its types distributed through 1996 – 2016 
 
Year 6 7 11 12 14 20 44 Other Fraud 
1996 1 1 2 2 2 0 2 2 4 
1997 3 1 4 2 4 0 3 4 7 
1998 10 2 7 6 9 4 5 7 17 
1999 11 2 8 7 11 7 5 8 22 
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2000 11 5 15 9 12 7 9 14 29 
2001 15 6 14 12 8 9 9 16 35 
2002 15 5 9 7 5 9 4 10 28 
2003 12 9 10 9 4 5 6 11 26 
2004 9 8 9 6 4 2 5 9 20 
2005 7 4 7 4 3 2 4 5 14 
2006 7 4 5 2 3 4 4 4 15 
2007 8 2 5 2 4 6 3 4 15 
2008 6 3 3 3 2 5 2 2 11 
2009 4 3 3 2 3 4 3 4 11 
2010 5 3 6 2 6 6 6 5 15 
2011 3 3 5 4 3 6 5 5 12 
2012 3 2 6 3 3 6 6 6 14 
2013 2 2 5 6 3 5 5 8 16 
2014 2 4 2 4 2 3 2 5 13 
2015 3 4 5 4 4 3 4 5 15 
2016 0 1 2 3 1 1 2 4 8 
Total 137 74 132 99 96 94 94 138 347 
  
It can be seen that during 1999 – 2004 there have been over 20 fraud cases per year. After that 
the number has dropped below 20 cases per year. During 2008 and 2009 when the latest 
financial crisis started, there have the lowest numbers of cases which is a bit surprising. On the 
other hand poor economic conditions lead to less money available and therefore less 
possibilities to commit fraud. 
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4. Findings 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
4.1.1 Continuous predictor variables 
 
Next table contains the descriptive statistic for all the continuous predictor variables of the 
final sample. For the final sample the data has been winsorized to 1% and 99% values of 
variables. 
Table 5  Continuous variables descriptive statistics 
 
count = 
59239 
Descriptive statistics 
Fraud 
predictor 
number 
Mean Std Min 25% Median 75% Max 
1 393,264 1219,445 0,058 7,034 38,613 191,376 8918,0 
2 0,170 0,107 0,008 0,107 0,155 0,210 0,688 
3 0,172 0,122 0,006 0,082 0,148 0,232 0,599 
4 15,415 51,860 0,000 0,200 1,106 5,902 382,000 
5 0,068 0,128 0,000 0,014 0,031 0,065 0,922 
6 0,010 0,019 0,000 0,002 0,004 0,010 0,138 
7 2,344 8,990 -53,690 1,269 2,782 4,715 29,690 
9 -0,002 0,051 -0,244 -0,010 0,000 0,008 0,211 
10 1,068 0,509 0,217 0,869 0,993 1,131 4,372 
11 1,280 4,373 -18,532 0,359 0,888 1,775 26,273 
14 0,534 0,420 0,023 0,214 0,424 0,750 2,152 
15 0,091 0,232 -0,358 -0,011 0,053 0,138 1,487 
16 0,353 0,316 -1,663 0,225 0,352 0,516 0,912 
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17 -0,362 1,393 -9,214 -0,424 0,008 0,259 0,875 
18 -7,13E-17 0,985 -6,075 -0,213 -0,022 0,149 6,078 
19 0,116 0,123 0,000 0,014 0,093 0,169 0,667 
20 2712,64 8020,28 0,546 49,380 279,57 1395,95 57428,0 
22 -0,028 0,170 -1,496 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,024 
23 0,252 0,217 0,005 0,081 0,185 0,364 0,879 
24 1,186 0,841 0,070 0,614 0,994 1,513 4,656 
26 193,480 789,413 -236,98 -1,473 3,350 13,747 3535,3 
27 -0,099 0,230 -1,616 -0,111 -0,055 -0,014 0,266 
28 0,593 0,487 0,067 0,338 0,521 0,694 3,780 
29 -2,701 2,609 -19,235 -3,366 -2,135 -1,267 0,491 
34 0,943 0,354 0,000 1,000 1,000 1,039 1,743 
35 5,632E-18 0,354 -1,654 -0,142 -0,023 0,074 2,642 
 
There are variables with different scales in the above table. For this reason the training set is 
standardized before fitting the logistic regression model, the corresponding test set is 
transformed using the training set mean and standard deviation used in the standardization. 
It is quite difficult to make determinations of the variables based on the table above. This is 
why the continuous predictor variables are divided into 4 classes based on the quartile ranges 
in the fraud type. The resulting fraud and non-fraud classes are tested with the χ2-homogeneity 
test which tests the equality of the different ratios belonging to different classes. The χ2-
homogeneity test used here 
 𝐻0:   𝜋𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑥 < 𝑥1) = 𝜋𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑥 < 𝑥1) 
         𝜋𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑥1 ≤ 𝑥 < 𝑥2) = 𝜋𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑥1 ≤ 𝑥 < 𝑥2) 
         𝜋𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑥2 ≤ 𝑥 < 𝑥3) = 𝜋𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑥2 ≤ 𝑥 < 𝑥3) 
         𝜋𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑥 ≥ 𝑥3) = 𝜋𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑥 ≥ 𝑥3) 
𝐻𝑎:   𝐴𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 
(35) 
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where x is a predictor variable under study, π are the proportions in the corresponding class 
(defined below) and typically x1,2,3 are the 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 quartile.
8
 The χ2-homogeneity test for 
fraud is done as follows using the frequency table 
Table 6 The frequency table of fraud with the quartile ranges defined using fraud class 
 
 Fraud Non-fraud Total 
x < x1 nf,1 nnf,1 𝑁1 = 𝑛𝑓,1 + 𝑛𝑛𝑓,1 
x1 ≤ x < x2 nf,2 nnf,2 𝑁2 = 𝑛𝑓,2 + 𝑛𝑛𝑓,2 
x2 ≤ x < x3 nf,3 nnf,3 𝑁3 = 𝑛𝑓,3 + 𝑛𝑛𝑓,3 
x ≥ x3 nf,4 nnf,4 𝑁4 = 𝑛𝑓,4 + 𝑛𝑛𝑓,4 
Total 𝑁𝑓 =∑𝑛𝑓,𝑖
4
𝑖=1
 𝑁𝑛𝑓 =∑𝑛𝑛𝑓,𝑖
4
𝑖=1
 
𝑁 = 𝑁𝑓 + 𝑁𝑛𝑓 =
𝑁1 + 𝑁2 + 𝑁3 +𝑁4  
 
The χ2-statistic is calculated as follows 
 
𝜒2 =∑ ∑
(𝑛𝑗,𝑖 − 𝐸𝑗,𝑖)
2
𝐸𝑗,𝑖
𝑗=𝑓,𝑛𝑓
4
𝑖=1
 
𝐸𝑗,𝑖 =
𝑁𝑖 ∗ 𝑁𝑗
𝑁
 
𝑑𝑜𝑓 = (4 − 1) ∗ (2 − 1) = 3 
𝜋𝑗(𝑖) =
𝑛𝑗,𝑖
𝑁𝑗
, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4,   𝑗 = 𝑓, 𝑛𝑓 
(36) 
The test requires that all the observed, nj,I, and expected, Ej,I, values are at least 5. The test for 
fraud types is run similarly, just replace fraud above with the corresponding fraud type. The 
results of the tests and the summary of p-values for each continuous predictor variable are 
presented in the next table. The complete table of p-values is in the Appendix. 
                                                          
8
 Sometimes one of the quartiles have to be replaced by some other value in order to have at least 5 
observations and expected number of observations in all the classes. 
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Table 7 Frequency table of p-values of the continuous predictor variables under the χ2 
homogeneity test, if Bonferroni correction is taken into account the limit of significance is 
0,05 / 9 = 0,0056 
 
  Frequency of fraud types 
Predictor Name of the predictor variable 
p-value > 
0,05 
0,0056 < p-
value ≤ 0,05 
p-value < 
0,0056 
1 Accounts receivable 1 --- 8 
2 Accounts receivable to sales 1 1 7 
3 
Accounts receivable to total 
assets 
1 --- 8 
4 
Allowance of doubtful 
accounts (AFDA) 
1 1 7 
5 AFDA to accounts receivable 8 --- 1 
6 AFDA to net sales 1 4 4 
7 Altman Z-score 1 1 7 
9 
Current minus prior year 
inventory to sales 
8 1 --- 
10 Days in receivables index 4 --- 5 
11 Debt to equity 2 3 4 
14 Fixed assets to total assets 4 2 3 
15 
Four year geometric sales 
growth rate 
7 2 --- 
16 Gross margin 1 5 3 
17 
Holding period return in the 
violation period 
9 --- --- 
18 Industry ROE minus firm ROE 9 --- --- 
19 Inventory to sales 4 3 2 
20 Net sales 1 --- 8 
22 Prior year ROA to total assets 3 3 3 
23 Property, plant and equipment 3 4 2 
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to total assets 
24 Sales to total assets 3 4 2 
26 Times interest earned 1 3 5 
27 Total accruals to total assets 7 2 --- 
28 Total debt to total assets 6 2 1 
29 Total discretionary accruals 4 --- 5 
34 
Value of Issued Securities to 
Market Value 
2 1 6 
35 
Unexpected Employee 
Productivity 
9 --- --- 
 
The results of the test show that predictor variables 17, 18 and 35 (holding period return in the 
violation period, industry return on equity minus firm return on equity and unexpected 
employee productivity) do not have any p-value below 0,05. The fact that unexpected 
employee productivity produces this result is surprising, because it is one of the variables that 
was found to be among selected variables with logistic regression by Perols (2011). This does 
not mean that this is necessarily a contradiction with Perols. It may well be that unexpected 
employee productivity needs other variables to show difference between fraud and non-fraud. 
On the other hand predictor variables 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 20 and 34 (accounts receivable, accounts 
receivable to sales, accounts receivable to total assets, allowance of doubtful accounts, Altman 
Z-score, net sales and value of issued securities to market value) have at least 6 of the tests 
with p-values below 0,05 / 9, where the division is based on making 9 different tests, the so 
called Bonferroni correction. These are therefore expected to show variation in the 
corresponding predictor variable distribution for the fraud (type) and non-fraud (type) classes. 
Accounts receivable, allowance of doubtful accounts and value of issued securities to market 
value were among the variables that Perols found for logistic regression. 
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4.1.2 Fraud predictor 25: auditor turnover 
 
Auditor turnover variable has only 4 different values since it counts the number of auditors 
changing in the past 3 years: 0, 1, 2 and 3.  
Table 8 Auditor turnover descriptive statistics in the past 3 years 
 
Fraud predictor 25 
Auditor turnover 
Frequency Fraud Non-
fraud 
% of 
fraud 
% of non-
fraud 
%-
difference 
0 46185 261 45924 75,21 77,98 -2,77 
1 11007 68 10939 19,60 18,57 1,03 
2 1756 16 1740 4,61 2,95 1,66 
3 291 2 289 0,58 0,49 0,09 
Total 59239 347 58892 100,00 99,99  
 
As an impression the auditor turnover variable (fraud predictor 25) seems to have a slightly 
larger portion turnovers = 0 in the non-fraud category than in the fraud category, whereas with 
turnover > 0 the fraction is slightly higher in the fraud category. It is also to the direction one 
would expect, if one wants to have the positive coefficient for the logistic regression. Namely 
the percentage of fraud should be higher than the percentage of non-fraud when auditor 
turnover is greater than 0, and the other way around when it is 0. However, the differences are 
not large. This is one of the variables, which Perols (2011) found significant, so maybe the tilt 
in the distribution is enough. This can be tested with the χ2 homogeneity test, equation (34). 
Because fraud class has only 2 cases with auditor turnover = 3, it has to be combined with 
auditor turnover = 2 class to get at least 5 cases for the each combination of auditor turnover 
and fraud type. Furthermore expected number has to be at least 5 and with some fraud types 
auditor turnover = 1, 2, 3 had to be combined into one class. The results are in the following 
table 
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Table 9 Auditor turnover p-values for χ2-statistic 
 
Fraud 
type 
6 7 11 12 14 20 44 other Fraud 
P-value 0,887 0,021 0,739 0,939 0,101 0,762 0,194 0,550 0,169 
 
Only the fraud type 7, Expense (payroll, SGA, other) recording issues, has a p-value below 
0,05, the rest have a non-significant p-value. Since multiple hypotheses are tested here, it is 
possible that is happening just by chance. Applying Bonferroni correction to the significance 
level 0,05 / 9 = 0,0056 and now even the fraud type 7 is not significant. This is another 
surprising result because auditor turnover is also one of the predictor variables that got chosen 
in the study of Perols (2011) for logistic regression. Similarly to unexpected employee 
productivity this does not mean that one should discard auditor turnover, but rather that it does 
not differentiate between fraud (type) and non-fraud (type) by itself but could do it in 
combination with other variables. 
 
4.1.3 Binary predictor variables 
 
The rest of the predictor variables are of binary type. The frequencies are in the next table 
Table 10 Binary variables for fraud 
 
 All Fraud Non-fraud Fraud Non-fraud  
Fraud 
predictor 
0 1 0 1 0 1 % of 1s % of 1s %-diff. 
8 15777 43462 49 298 15728 43164 85,9 73,3 12,6 
12 46833 12406 301 46 46532 12360 13,3 21,0 -7,7 
13 38583 20656 230 117 38353 20539 33,7 34,9 -1,2 
21 55036 4203 323 24 54713 4179 6,9 7,1 -0,2 
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30 34032 25207 207 140 33825 25067 40,3 42,6 -2,3 
31 48566 10673 285 62 48281 10611 17,9 18,0 -0,1 
32 2192 57047 1 346 2191 56701 99,7 96,3 3,4 
33 38378 20861 261 86 38117 20775 24,8 35,3 -10,5 
 
The binary variables defined seem to differentiate between fraud and non-fraud with varying 
degrees. Fraud predictors 8 and 33 have over 10% difference in their distributions in the 
classes of fraud and non-fraud respectively, fraud predictor 12 is between 5-10% and the rest 
are below 5% difference. According to the predicted signs of the coefficients in section 2 all 
the predictor variables should have positive percentage difference. However, only fraud 
predictors 8 (big 4 auditor) and 32 (whether new securities were issued) have positive 
difference. The dummy variables are built in such a way that one would expect fraud cases 
correspond to having a larger proportion of 1 and non-fraud cases. This does not seem to be 
the case for most of the dummy variables. Especially fraud predictor 33, whether standard 
industry classification code is between 3000-3999 or not, has over 10% less of values 1 for 
fraud cases than for non-fraud cases. The usage of this variable was based on empirical 
findings by Lee et al. (1999). It seems that since then the situation has changed completely. 
But the 10% difference still means that this can be quite a good variable to use. The role it 
plays just has to be reversed. The same argument can be used for other binary variables. 
The differences were tested with the above mentioned χ2-statistic. With fraud predictor 32 the 
statistic is unreliable since the statistic requires at least 5 cases in the observed and expected 
classes and there is only one case with fraud and fraud predictor 32 = 0. The p-values 
associated with the statistic are in the below table for fraud and all the fraud types 
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Table 11 P-values of the χ2-statistic for the binary predictor variables, significant values with 
Bonferroni correction applied are bolded, significant values without Bonferroni correction are 
italized 
 
 
Fraud type 
Fraud 
predictor 
6 7 11 12 14 20 44 other fraud 
8 5,0E-4 0,956 4,3E-7 7,2E-4 1,1E-5 0,002 1,5E-5 1,0E-6 1,7E-7 
12 0,275 0,086 0,188 0,954 0,097 0,419 0,764 0,049 5,3E-4 
13 0,961 0,941 0,519 0,830 0,054 0,478 0,354 0,409 0,693 
21 0,942 0,213 0,469 0,032 0,901 0,946 0,052 0,923 0,980 
30 0,316 0,998 0,638 0,629 0,893 0,465 0,465 0,579 0,436 
31 0,249 0,062 0,231 0,486 0,394 0,700 0,144 0,234 0,998 
32 0,106 0,445 0,043 0,249 0,267 0,103 0,103 0,103 0,001 
33 2,1E-5 0,066 1,3E-4 0,121 0,028 0,931 0,063 0,012 5,7E-5 
 
The bolded values are significant even with the Bonferroni correction. The p-values for fraud 
predictor 32 are unreliable because there is class with less than 5 observable cases. Also fraud 
type 7 and predictor variable 21 the result is unreliable because there is class with less than 5 
observable cases. Big 4 auditor, fraud predictor 8, has 8 out of 9 tests with significant p-
values. Fraud predictor 33, is the standard industry classification code between 3000 and 3999 
or not, has 3 significant p-values with Bonferroni correction. This is also one of the variables 
that was found by Perols (2011) for logistic regression. 
 
4.1.4 Summary of descriptive statistics 
 
It was found that the variables accounts receivable, accounts receivable to sales, accounts 
receivable to total assets, allowance of doubtful accounts, Altman Z-score, net sales, value of 
issued securities to market value and big 4 auditor are significant including Bonferroni 
correction with at least 6 out 9 χ2-homogeneity tests. Accounts receivable, allowance of 
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doubtful accounts, value of issued securities to market value and big 4 auditor were among the 
variables that were also found by Perols (2011). The other variables Perols found were auditor 
turnover, total discretionary accruals, whether meeting or beating a forecast, inventory to sales 
and unexpected employee productivity. Of these latter whether meeting or beating a forecast 
used data that is not available in Compustat, so it is not included here at all. Auditor turnover 
and unexpected employee productivity had p-values in the χ2-homogeneity tests such that none 
of the 9 tests were significant when including the Bonferroni correction. Inventory to sales 
have 2 tests with significant p-values including Bonferroni correction, 3 significant when 
Bonferroni correction is not included and 4 not significant in any case. Total discretionary 
accruals have 5 tests significant with Bonferroni correction and 4 tests insignificant. 
 
4.2 Model results for fraud and types separately 
All the models are fitted by minimizing the objective function with the regularization term 
included. The dependent variable is fraud or one of the fraud value variables. Furthermore 5-
fold cross-validation is being used, so there are actually 5 models fitted per fraud type case. 
Training set is first balanced by replication and then variables chosen by recursive feature 
elimination while regularization parameter is set to 1. Feature elimination uses 5-fold cross-
validation inside the balanced training set. After this the model is fitted with the variables 
chosen in the previous step and fitting uses another 5-fold cross-validation in the balanced 
training set so that an optimal value of regularization parameter can be set, too. The 
continuous variables are standardized before fitting so that there are no different scales 
between variables. Test set variables are transformed with the corresponding training set 
means and standard deviations before prediction. 
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4.2.1 Predictor variables from model fitting 
 
When fitting the models, there are actually 5 different models fitted, 1 per fold. On top of that 
the training set uses itself 5-fold cross validation in recursive feature elimination to find the 
predictor variables that give the best results. Then another 5-fold cross validation is used to 
find the best regularization parameter value λ with the predictor variables that were found in 
the previous step. Once these steps are done the model is fitted with chosen predictor variables 
and regularization parameter λ over the whole training set. Different folds tend to choose 
different variables. In table 12 the predictor variables that were chosen in at least 4 folds are 
reported 
Table 12 Predictor variables chosen in at least 4 folds in each fraud category 
 
Fraud 
type 
Category title 
Number 
of folds 
Predictor variables chosen 
Number of 
variables 
Fraud Fraud 
5 
1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 
20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 32, 33, 
34 
19 
4 6, 21, 26, 28, 31, 35 6 
6 
Revenue recognition 
issues 
5 
3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 22, 27, 
32, 33 
11 
4 
2, 4, 5, 18, 20, 24, 26, 29, 30, 
31, 34, 35 
12 
7 
Expense (payroll, SGA, 
other) recording issues 
5 3, 9, 10, 15, 21, 22, 31, 32, 34 9 
4 
1, 4, 5, 6, 11, 20, 23, 25, 30, 
33 
10 
11 
Foreign, related party, 
affiliated, or subsidiary 
issues 
5 
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 14, 15, 16, 20, 
22, 24, 25, 32, 33 
15 
4 12, 19, 27, 34 4 
12 Liabilities, payables, 5 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12, 14, 20, 23, 14 
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reserves and accrual 
estimate failures 
32, 33, 34, 35 
4 7, 16, 26, 29 4 
14 
Accounts/loans 
receivable, investments 
& cash issues 
5 3, 8, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 33 8 
4 1, 13, 16, 20, 32, 34 6 
20 
Inventory, vendor 
and/or cost of sales 
issues 
5 
1, 6, 8, 14, 16, 20, 22, 24, 26, 
27, 29, 32, 34 
13 
4 5, 30 2 
44 
Foreign, subsidiary only 
issues (subcategory) 
5 
1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 15, 20, 22, 24, 
28, 30, 32, 33, 34 
14 
4 5, 6, 7, 13, 14, 16, 21, 27, 31 9 
Other 
All the other categories 
that are not 6, 7, 11, 12, 
14, 20 or 44 
5 
1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 23, 
32, 34 
12 
4 18, 21, 24, 25, 27, 31, 33, 35 8 
 
Comparing the results for fraud with the results of Perols (2011), here there are 19 predictor 
variables chosen in all folds, Perols had 9. There are 6 more variables that were chosen in 4 
out of 5 folds, but is missing from one fold. Perols made the variable selection over the whole 
dataset before the split to training and test sets, so he had only one set of variables to work 
with. The difference may well come from the fact that he had a smaller sample 51 fraud firms 
and 15934 non-fraud firms. Also the time span of Perols’ study is shorter, the years spanned 
are from 4
th
 quarter of 1998 to 4
th
 quarter of 2005. Here the sample size is 347 fraud cases and 
58944 non-fraud cases spanning years 1995 – 2016 in order to have enough data for the 
different fraud types. It is possible that there are also time effects here, which require more 
predictor variables to be used. The nature of fraud may have changed in time. 
In the following (P) means that Perols observed that variable, too. The 19 predictor variables 
chosen in all 5 folds are accounts receivable (P), accounts receivable to total assets, (AFDA) 
allowance for doubtful accounts (P), Altman Z-score, big 4 auditor (P), days in receivables 
index, demand for financing (ex ante), fixed assets to total assets, gross margin, net sales, prior 
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year ROA to total assets, property, plant and equipment to total assets, sales to total assets, the 
number of auditor turnovers (P), total accruals to total assets, whether new securities were 
issued, whether Standard Industry Classification Code larger than 2999 and smaller than 4000 
and value of issued securities to market value (P). The 6 variables that were chosen in 4 out of 
5 folds are AFDA to net sales, positive accruals dummy, times interest earned, total debt to 
total assets, whether gross margin percent > 1,1 * of last year’s gross margin percent and 
unexpected employee productivity (P). In addition Perols observed total discretionary 
accruals, whether meeting or beating a forecast (requires data not available in Compustat) and 
inventory to sales. Even if some of the variables were not selected with fraud model, they got 
selected in fraud type models. Total discretionary accruals got selected in all folds in fraud 
type 20 (inventory, vendor and/or cost of sales issues), and in 4 out of 5 folds in fraud type 6 
(revenue recognition issues) and fraud type 12 (liabilities, payables, reserves and accrual 
estimate failures). Inventory to sales got selected in 4 out of 5 folds in fraud type 11 (foreign, 
related party, affiliated, or subsidiary issues). Perols et al. (2017) did not give a list of 
variables, which the models had chosen, so no comparison can be made with their results. 
Overall all the models contain more variables than what Perols had in his study for logistic 
regression, even the fraud type models. The fraud type models have fewer variables in general 
in them than in the fraud model. This is as expected. Many forms of fraud may have 
competing effects that may cancel each other to some degree, so more variables are needed to 
cover this. Fraud type models look for the effects on the single type, so having fewer variables 
for them is natural. However, since the fraud type models still contain more variables than 
what Perols had, there is clearly room for improvement. Another reason for Perols having 
fewer variables is that he used forward selection to choose the variables. Here backward 
selection, recursively removing variables one by one until no improvement is observed, was 
used. It is natural to have more variables remaining with this method. 
In the following table 13 the information of table 12 is re-written in terms of the predictor 
variables. In addition the signs of the coefficients have been produced, too. 
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Table 13 Fraud types that the predictor variables was chosen in, (m+, n-) means m folds with 
+ and n folds with -, if no numbers, coefficient on all folds of the sign given, fraud types in 
bold have the sign of the predictor variable coefficient opposite of the predicted sign 
 
Predi
ctor 
Name 
Number 
of folds 
Fraud types chosen in (sign) 
Predic-
ted sign 
1 Accounts receivable 
5 
fraud (+), 11 (+), 12 (+), 20 (+), 
44 (+), other (+) + 
4 7 (+), 14 (+) 
2 
Accounts receivable to 
sales 
5 
fraud (+), 11 (4-, 1+), 12 (+), 44 
(-), other (+)  
4 6 (-) 
3 
Accounts receivable to 
total assets 
5 
fraud (+), 6 (+), 7 (+), 11 (+), 12 
(+), 14 (+), 44 (+), other (+) 
 
4 
Allowance of doubtful 
accounts (AFDA) 
5 fraud (+), 12 (+), other (-) 
- 
4 6 (+), 7 (-) 
5 
AFDA to accounts 
receivable 
5 11 (-) 
- 
4 6 (-), 7 (-), 20 (-), 44 (-) 
6 AFDA to net sales 
5 6 (+), 11 (+), 12 (-), 20 (+) 
 
4 fraud (3+, 1-), 7 (+), 44 (+) 
7 Altman Z-score 
5 fraud (-), 6 (-), other (-) 
- 
4 12 (-), 44 (-) 
8 Big 4 auditor 5 
fraud (+), 6 (+), 11 (+), 12 (+), 
14 (+), 20 (+), 44 (+), other (+) 
+ 
9 
Current minus prior year 
inventory to sales 
5 7 (+), 44 (+)  
10 Days in receivables index 5 fraud (-), 6 (-), 7 (-), other (-) + 
11 Debt to equity 4 7 (+) + 
12 Demand for financing 5 fraud (-), 6 (-), 12 (-), other (-) + 
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(ex ante) 4 11 (-) 
13 
Declining cash sales 
dummy 
4 14 (-), 44 (-) + 
14 
Fixed assets to total 
assets 
5 
fraud (-), 6 (-), 11 (-), 12 (-), 20 
(-), other (-)  
4 44 (-) 
15 
Four year geometric sales 
growth rate 
5 7 (-), 11 (-), 44 (-) + 
16 Gross margin 
5 fraud (-), 11 (-), 20 (-) 
 
4 12 (-), 14 (-), 44 (-) 
17 
Holding period return in 
the violation period 
--- --- + 
18 
Industry ROE minus firm 
ROE 
4 6 (3+, 1-), other (+)  
19 Inventory to sales 4 11 (-)  
20 Net sales 
5 
fraud (-), 11 (-), 12 (-), 20 (-), 
44 (-) + 
4 6 (3+, 1-), 7 (-), 14 (-) 
21 Positive accruals dummy 
5 7 (-), 14 (-) 
+ 
4 fraud (-), 44 (3-, 1+), other (-) 
22 
Prior year ROA to total 
assets 
5 
fraud (+), 6 (+), 7 (+), 11 (+), 14 
(+), 20 (+), 44 (+) 
+ 
23 
Property, plant and 
equipment to total assets 
5 fraud (+), 12 (+), other (+) 
 
4 7 (+) 
24 Sales to total assets 
5 
fraud (+), 11 (-), 14 (-), 20 (+), 
44 (-)  
4 other (+) 
25 
The number of auditor 
turnovers 
5 fraud (+), 11 (+), 14 (-) 
+ 
4 7 (+), other (+) 
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26 Times interest earned 
5 14 (-), 20 (-) 
 
4 fraud (-), 6 (-), 12 (-) 
27 
Total accruals to total 
assets 
5 fraud (+), 6 (+), 20 (+) 
+ 
4 11 (+), 44 (+), other (+) 
28 Total debt to total assets 
5 44 (-) 
+ 
4 fraud (+) 
29 
Total discretionary 
accruals 
5 20 (-) 
+ 
4 6 (+), 12 (+) 
30 
Whether accounts 
receivable > 1,1 * of last 
year’s accounts 
receivable 
5 44 (-) 
+ 
4 6 (+), 7 (+), 20 (3-, 1+) 
31 
Whether gross margin 
percent  > 1,1 * of last 
year’s gross margin 
percent 
5 7 (+) 
+ 
4 fraud (+), 6 (-), 44 (-), other (-) 
32 
Whether new securities 
were issued 
5 
fraud (+), 6 (+), 7 (4-, 1+), 11 
(+), 12 (4-, 1+), 20 (+), 44 (+), 
other (+) 
+ 
4 14 (+) 
33 
Whether Standard 
Industry Classification 
Code larger than 2999 
and smaller than 4000 
5 
fraud (-), 6 (-), 11 (-), 12 (-), 14 
(-), 44 (-) 
+ 
4 7 (-),  other (-) 
34 
Value of Issued 
Securities to Market 
Value 
5 
fraud (+), 7 (+), 12 (+), 20 (+), 
44 (+), other (+) + 
4 6 (+), 11 (+), 14 (+) 
35 
Unexpected Employee 
Productivity 
5 12 (-) 
 
4 fraud (-), 6 (-), other (-) 
 
  
 
 
59 
 
Based on the descriptive statistics accounts receivable, accounts receivable to sales, accounts 
receivable to total assets, allowance of doubtful accounts, Altman Z-score, net sales, value of 
issued securities to market value and big 4 auditor were expected to be found among the 
predictor variables. All these had at least 6 out 9 χ2-homogeneity tests with p-values below the 
significance level with Bonferroni correction (0,05 / 9). Of these accounts receivable is found 
in 6 (5 folds) and 2 (4 folds) models, accounts receivable to sales in 5 (5 folds) and 1 (4 folds) 
models, accounts receivable to total assets in 8 (5 folds) models, allowance for doubtful 
accounts in 3 (5 folds) and 2 (4 folds) models, Altman Z-score in 3 (5 folds) and 2 (4 folds) 
models, big 4 auditor in 8 (5 folds) models, net sales in 5 (5 folds) and 3 (4 folds) models, and 
value of issued securities to market value in 6 (5 folds) and 3 (4 folds) models. In some cases 
the variables chosen are the same that had significant p-values in the χ2-homogeneity tests, but 
in some cases it is not. For example accounts receivable to total assets and big 4 auditor appear 
in the same fraud types as tests of differences indicated. But for example accounts receivable 
does not appear in at least 4 folds in fraud type 6 (revenue recognition issues), but instead 
appears in fraud type 7 (expense (payroll, SGA, other) recording issues) which had non-
significant p-value in tests of difference, see table 38 in Appendix. However, majority of the 
variables appearing correspond to the results of tests of differences. 
In table 13 the signs of coefficients have also been produced. The signs differ from the 
predicted ones in Section 2 for 14 out 34 variables (1 was not chosen at all). However, with 8 
of the 14 predictor variables the sign issue is with some of the fraud types, not all. With 6 
predictor variables the sign issue happens with all the fraud types. With most of the variables 
with the wrong sign of the coefficient the descriptive statistics supports the sign. However, 
with net sales the situation is different. Net sales has descriptive statistics clearly supporting 
the positive sign for the coefficient, the mean value for fraud cases is larger than for non-fraud 
cases and all percentiles, too. So the whole distribution for fraud cases supports higher net 
sales than for non-fraud cases. Net sales appear in many variables, in some variables in the 
nominator and in other variables in the denominator. So the net effect of net sales is a bit 
ambiguous. 
The tables of coefficients of the fitted models are not produced here, because there would be 5 
of them for each fold times, 9 for each fraud type and fraud itself, each table containing as 
  
 
 
60 
 
many rows as there are variables in the model. Second as explained in the Data and methods 
section 3.1 the regularization parameter decreases the variance of the coefficients, in practise 
all of the coefficients tend to be highly significant because of the regularization. Altogether 
there are 1117 coefficients including intercepts and all the 5 folds. Of these 1103 have p-value 
below 0,01. The fitting is done on the training set and the variances and significance tests are 
based on the training set. The coefficients are not fitted on the test set, unlike the performance 
measures, which are estimated using the test set. Furthermore the performance measures relate 
directly to the question predicting fraud as well as possible. Therefore the performance 
measures should be considered as the test of the coefficients, too. 
 
4.2.2 Results with probability threshold 0,5 
 
Here the probability threshold of the model is 0,5 meaning that the predictions are formed as 
follows 
 
?̂? = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝(𝑦 = 1|𝒙) > 0,5
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝(𝑦 = 1|𝒙) ≤ 0,5
 (37) 
Furthermore the test sets over the folds are pooled together and then the measures are 
calculated. This is micro averaging. Another way is to calculate the performance measures 
separately for each fold and then average the results, called macro averaging. The micro 
averaging results were chosen here because the macro average does not make sense in all 
cases to follow, like with ROC curves. 
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Table 14 Average performance measures when the threshold probability p0=0,5, standard 
errors are in parentheses 
 
Fraud 
type 
Accuracy 
(s.e.) 
Precision 
(s.e.) 
Sensitivity 
(s.e.) 
Specificity 
(s.e.) 
Fraud 
0,6554 
(0,0020) 
0,0107 
(7,18E-4) 
0,6311 
(0,0259) 
0,6556 
(0,0020) 
6 
0,6946 
(0,0019) 
0,0050 
(5,25E-4) 
0,6642 
(0,0403) 
0,6947 
(0,0019) 
7 
0,7346 
(0,0018) 
0,0027 
(4,16E-4) 
0,5811 
(0,0574) 
0,7347 
(0,0018) 
11 
0,7025 
(0,0019) 
0,0051 
(5,38E-4) 
0,6894 
(0,0403) 
0,7025 
(0,0019) 
12 
0,7404 
(0,0018) 
0,0043 
(5,26E-4) 
0,6667 
(0,0474) 
0,7405 
(0,0018) 
14 
0,6723 
(0,0019) 
0,0032 
(4,04E-4) 
0,6458 
(0,0488) 
0,6724 
(0,0019) 
20 
0,6385 
(0,0020) 
0,0027 
(3,55E-4) 
0,6170 
(0,0501) 
0,6385 
(0,0020) 
44 
0,7163 
(0,0019) 
0,0039 
(4,81E-4) 
0,7021 
(0,0472) 
0,7163 
(0,0019) 
Other 
0,6812 
(0,0019) 
0,0051 
(5,16E-4) 
0,6957 
(0,0392) 
0,6811 
(0,0019) 
 
Looking at the table one can see that the accuracy with the fraud types tends to be higher than 
the accuracy of the fraud class itself. The sole exception is the fraud type 20 which has 
approximately 1,7% lower accuracy than fraud. The best accuracy is with fraud type 12 which 
74% accuracy. The reason may well be that there are more non-fraud cases with the types than 
with fraud class itself. Precision on the other hand is better with fraud than with the types. 
Reason may again be the lower number cases with the types. With sensitivity the picture is 
more complicated, fraud is roughly in the middle with 63% whereas the types vary from 58% 
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with type 7 to 70% with type 44. Fraud class tends to have lower specificity than the types. 
Fraud specificity is 66% while the lowest value is 64% with type 20 and the highest 74% with 
type 12. 
If one were to compare the results of micro or macro averaging, one sees that the performance 
measures itself do not change much if at all. When there is a change, it is smaller than the 
corresponding standard errors. 
 
4.2.3 Receiving operating curves 
 
Receiving operating characteristic curves (ROC) give the performance of a classifier when the 
threshold probability varies from 0 to 1. The results here are based on pooling the test results 
over the folds back together to form the original test set with the probabilities for each case. 
Figure 3 Receiving operating characteristic curves for fraud and fraud types 
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In the figures above the fraud type ROC curve is drawn along with fraud and random choice 
ROC curves for comparison. Typically a classifier is better than another if its ROC curve is to 
the left and above of the ROC curve of the other classifier. All the fraud types and fraud 
definitely perform better than random choice. With fraud types 14 and 20 there are ranges in 
the small false positive rate (FPR) region where they seem to perform only at level of random 
choice, but over the majority of the range they perform better than random choice. 
Comparison between fraud and fraud types is much more involved. There are ranges where 
the fraud types perform better than fraud class and vice versa. Fraud types 6, 7, 11, 12 and 44 
have a range where they are better than fraud and outside perform similarly to fraud, so these 
can be considered to perform better than fraud based on the ROC curves. Fraud types other 
has a range, where it performs better than fraud, and a range, where it performs worse than 
fraud. Altogether one can say that fraud other performs equally well as fraud. Fraud types 14 
and 20 have a large range, where they perform worse than fraud, and outside it at the same 
level as fraud. Based on this it can be said that fraud types 14 and 20 perform worse than 
fraud. 
The differences in the performance in different regions can be taken into account by 
calculating the area under the ROC curve (AUC), area between horizontal axis and the curve. 
A perfectly performing classifier would have a ROC curve connecting the points (1, 1), (0, 1) 
and (0, 0) and have an area 1. Random choice has an area 0,5. The AUCs for the pooled test 
set is in the table below 
Table 15 Areas under the ROC curves 
 
Fraud 
type 
6 7 11 12 14 20 44 other fraud 
AUC 0,7367 0,7277 0,7466 0,7802 0,6871 0,6809 0,7548 0,7287 0,7103 
AUC 
s.e. 
0,0245 0,0336 0,0248 0,0276 0,0302 0,0306 0,0291 0,0246 0,0157 
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The AUC results support the conclusion obtained through studying ROC curves. However, the 
standard errors on them are such that fraud AUC would be contained within 2 standard error 
confidence interval of fraud type AUCs, with the exception of fraud type 12. 
Although some fraud type classifiers seem to perform better than fraud itself, one cannot infer 
from this that they are better. First of all the classifiers do not measure the same thing. Second 
the probability threshold to be used has to be determined somehow and then compare the 
results. 
 
4.2.3 Expected relative costs 
 
Here the probability threshold p0 is chosen in such a way that the expected relative costs are 
minimized 
 
𝐸𝑅𝐶 = 𝐶𝐹𝑁
𝐹𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃
 𝑃(𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑) + 𝐶𝐹𝑃
𝐹𝑃
𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑁
 (1 − 𝑃(𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑)) (38) 
with several different values for relative costs r and prior fraud probability P(fraud). The 
amounts of TP, FP, FN and TN change when the probability threshold changes. The tables 
below contains the results for fraud and the corresponding performance measures 
Table 16 Minimum expected relative costs and the threshold probabilities when CFP = 1 and 
CFN is set according to the table below 
 
 ERC p0 
 CFP / CFN CFP / CFN 
P(fraud) 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 
0,001 0,0047 0,015 0,021 0,046 0,933 0,894 0,880 0,834 
0,01 0,015 0,046 0,065 0,142 0,894 0,828 0,810 0,734 
0,1 0,044 0,135 0,187 0,387 0,828 0,717 0,677 0,605 
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The expected relative costs increase when prior fraud probability and the difference between 
the costs of false positives and false negatives increase. One can look at that when prior fraud 
probability goes from 0,001 to 0,1 the expected relative costs become approximately 8-10 
times the starting value. The same can be observed when the relative cost ratio changes from 1 
to 0,01, the expected relative cost is approximately 8-10 times the starting value. At the same 
time the threshold probability decreases. Essentially the more there is fraud to begin with, the 
larger the prior fraud probability, and the more making the mistake of classifying fraud as non-
fraud costs compared to the mistake of classifying non-fraud as fraud, the more is the expected 
relative cost. In Table 5 of Perols (2011) the expected relative costs were between 0,0026 and 
0,91, with mean 0,2916 and standard deviation 0,2367. It is unclear over what range has Perols 
computed his values. It seems like he has aggregated over the prior fraud probabilities and cost 
ratios. However, the values here are compatible to values produced by Perols. 
Standard errors are not produced here for the expected relative costs because only one 
minimum value is produced by the test set. Some statistics can be calculated if one takes the 
averages over the 5 folds, as in the table 17 below. 
Table 17 Expected relative costs averaged over 5 folds, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 CFP / CFN 
P(fraud) 1 0,1 0,01 
0,001 
0,0047 
(7,8E-5) 
0,015 
(2,3E-4) 
0,046 
(0,0017) 
0,01 
0,015 
(2,2E-4) 
0,046 
(0,0016) 
0,141 
(0,0048) 
0,1 
0,044 
(0,0016) 
0,134 
(0,0041) 
0,382 
(0,0203) 
 
There is no practical difference in the averages over the folds compared to the minimizing 
over the whole test set. If one wanted better statistics, one would need to repeat the process 
multiple times. For example Perols (2011) used the 10-fold cross validation, which was 
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repeated 10 times. Here 5 folds were used, because the time it took to run 5 folds was a couple 
of minute, but with 10 folds the time increase was not double but much more than that.  
Next we look at the other performance measures with the threshold probabilities obtained 
through minimizing the expected relative costs. Here the comparison is done between fraud 
and fraud type 6 only. The other types show similar behaviour 
Table 18 Accuracy of fraud and fraud type 6 with threshold probability minimizing expected 
relative cost, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 Fraud Fraud type 6 
 CFP / CFN CFP / CFN 
P(fraud) 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 
0,001 
0,9919 
(3,7E-4) 
0,9870 
(4,7E-4) 
0,9841 
(5,1E-4) 
0,9726 
(6,7E-4) 
0,9910 
(3,9E-4) 
0,9821 
(5,5E-4) 
0,9786 
(6,0E-4) 
0,9625 
(7,8E-4) 
0,01 
0,9870 
(4,7E-4) 
0,9704 
(7,0E-4) 
0,9639 
(7,7E-4) 
0,9290 
(1,1E-3) 
0,9821 
(5,5E-4) 
0,9600 
(8,1E-4) 
0,9530 
(8,7E-4) 
0,9110 
(1,2E-3) 
0,1 
0,9704 
(7,0E-4) 
0,9188 
(1,1E-3) 
0,8865 
(1,3E-3) 
0,8124 
(1,6E-3) 
0,9600 
(8,1E-4) 
0,8998 
(1,2E-3) 
0,8688 
(1,4E-3) 
0,8056 
(1,6E-3) 
 
The accuracy decreases when the prior probability of fraud increases and when the relative 
cost, CFP/CFN, decreases. This is connected to the behaviour of the probability threshold and is 
what one would expect. One should note that the accuracy for fraud is better than the accuracy 
for fraud type 6. This is in contrast to the results with threshold probability 0,5. Similar results 
are seen with other fraud types. 
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Table 19 Precision with threshold probabilities minimizing the expected relative cost for fraud 
and fraud type 6, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 Fraud Fraud type 6 
 CFP / CFN CFP / CFN 
P(fraud) 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 
0,001 
0,0347 
(0,0153) 
0,0204 
(0,0067) 
0,0194 
(0,0056) 
0,0217 
(0,0040) 
0,0075 
(0,0043) 
0,0085 
(0,0030) 
0,0070 
(0,0025) 
0,0076 
(0,0019) 
0,01 
0,0204 
(0,0067) 
0,0211 
(0,0038) 
0,0193 
(0,0032) 
0,0151 
(0,0019) 
0,0085 
(0,0030) 
0,0079 
(0,0019) 
0,0074 
(0,0017) 
0,0065 
(0,0011) 
0,1 
0,0211 
(0,0038) 
0,0148 
(0,0018) 
0,0146 
(0,0015) 
0,0131 
(0,0011) 
0,0079 
(0,0019) 
0,0070 
(0,0011) 
0,0070 
(9,5E-4) 
0,0060 
(7,2E-4) 
 
The behavior of precision when prior fraud probability and the relative cost are changed. 
There is no clear cut picture. The behavior between different columns and rows is not the 
same. The only consistent thing is that the precision for fraud is higher than precision for fraud 
type 6. All the other fraud types have similar results to fraud type 6. 
Table 20 Sensitivity with threshold probabilities minimizing the expected relative cost for 
fraud and fraud type 6, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 Fraud Fraud type 6 
 CFP / CFN CFP / CFN 
P(fraud) 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 
0,001 
0,0144 
(0,0064) 
0,0259 
(0,0085) 
0,0346 
(0,0098) 
0,0836 
(0,0149) 
0,0219 
(0,0125) 
0,0584 
(0,0200) 
0,0584 
(0,0200) 
0,1168 
(0,0274) 
0,01 
0,0259 
(0,0085) 
0,0893 
(0,0153) 
0,1037 
(0,0164) 
0,1729 
(0,0203) 
0,0584 
(0,0200) 
0,1314 
(0,0289) 
0,1460 
(0,0302) 
0,2482 
(0,0369) 
0,1 
0,0893 
(0,0153) 
0,1960 
(0,0213) 
0,2767 
(0,0240) 
0,4179 
(0,0265) 
0,1314 
(0,0289) 
0,2993 
(0,0391) 
0,3942 
(0,0418) 
0,5037 
(0,0427) 
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For fraud type 6 the sensitivity is in every case higher than sensitivity for fraud. This does not 
happen with all the fraud types, some of them have higher sensitivity than fraud just like type 
6, but some of them have lower sensitivity than fraud. Sensitivity increases when prior fraud 
increases and the difference between costs increase. Also the difference between sensitivity of 
fraud and fraud type 6 tend to be larger when prior fraud is larger and difference between costs 
is larger. 
Table 21 Specificity with threshold probabilities minimizing the expected relative cost for 
fraud and fraud type 6, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 Fraud Fraud type 6 
 CFP / CFN CFP / CFN 
P(fraud) 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 
0,001 
0,9976 
(2,0E-4) 
0,9926 
(3,5E-4) 
0,9897 
(4,2E-4) 
0,9778 
(6,1E-4) 
0,9933 
(3,4E-4) 
0,9842 
(5,1E-4) 
0,9807 
(5,7E-4) 
0,9645 
(7,6E-4) 
0,01 
0,9926 
(3,5E-4) 
0,9756 
(6,4E-4) 
0,9689 
(7,2E-4) 
0,9335 
(0,0010) 
0,9842 
(5,1E-4) 
0,9619 
(7,9E-4) 
0,9548 
(8,5E-4) 
0,9126 
(0,0012) 
0,1 
0,9756 
(6,4E-4) 
0,9231 
(0,0011) 
0,8901 
(0,0013) 
0,8147 
(0,0016) 
0,9619 
(7,9E-4) 
0,9012 
(0,0012) 
0,8699 
(0,0014) 
0,8063 
(0,0016) 
 
Specificity is consistently 0,01-0,02 higher for fraud than for fraud type 6. This holds also for 
other types. The tendency here is that specificity decreases when prior fraud increases and 
then difference between the two costs increase. Difference in specificity is smaller for smaller 
prior fraud and small difference between costs. 
With the performance measures one should remember that they are obtained for minimum 
expected relative costs of fraud. In a true comparison one should calculate the minimum 
expected relative costs for fraud type 6 and then do the comparison. However, since there are 
troubles with defining the expected relative costs for fraud types themselves, this is not done 
and for the same reason the expected relative costs for fraud types are not produced. Other 
possibility is to define the relevant threshold probability for the fraud types. One way to do 
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this is using the threshold probability coming from minimizing the expected relative cost of 
combining the fraud types, which is done in the next section. 
Overall the expected relative costs of fraud are on the same level with what was found by 
Perols (2011). The other performance measures vary a lot when the prior fraud probability and 
ratio of costs are changed. Accuracy and specificity for fraud are slightly better than for fraud 
type 6, similar behavior holds for other fraud types. Precision is clearly much better for fraud 
than for fraud type 6, and the same is true for other fraud types. Sensitivity is much more 
involved. For some types the sensitivity is better than for fraud, but for other types sensitivity 
of fraud is better. Second the difference between sensitivity of fraud and fraud type 6 changes 
a lot when prior fraud probability and cost ratio are changed. They are at the same level when 
cost ratio = 1 and prior fraud probability = 0,1% but the difference can be even 0,12 for other 
combinations of cost ratio and prior fraud probability. 
 
4.3 Combined model results 
In this section some of the fraud types are combined to produce a new predictor of fraud. The 
method used is a majority vote: if the majority of the fraud types models predict a case to be of 
that fraud type, the case is predicted to be fraud, otherwise it is non-fraud. Here we would like 
to have the combination that covers the fraud class as much as possible and to have the fraud 
type ROC curves to be better than fraud ROC curve. Looking at the results in section 4.2.3 we 
can see that types 6, 7, 11, 12 and 44 have ROC curves that are better than fraud ROC curve in 
the region where the expected relative costs of fraud are minimized. A combination of types 6, 
11 and 12 is chosen because the union of these covers the fraud class most completely of the 3 
type combinations, 253 cases of the 347 total. 
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4.3.1 Results where threshold probability is 0,5 
 
The results for using the common threshold probability 0,5 for all the fraud types 6, 11 and 12 
and then using a vote to determine whether prediction is fraud or not. The same can be 
accomplished by using the median of the probabilities for types 6, 11 and 12 and testing 
whether it is larger or smaller than 0,5. 
Table 22 Performance measures of voting with the same threshold probability for all types 
 
 
Accuracy 
(s.e.) 
Precision 
(s.e.) 
Sensitivity 
(s.e.) 
Specificity 
(s.e.) 
Combined 
6, 11 and 12 
0,7351 
(0,0018) 
0,0118 
(8,6E-4) 
0,5331 
(0,0268) 
0,7363 
(0,0018) 
Fraud 
0,6554 
(0,0020) 
0,0107 
(7,2E-4) 
0,6311 
(0,0259) 
0,6556 
(0,0020) 
 
As can be seen all the performance measures are better for the voting result than for fraud 
itself except sensitivity which gives the proportion of predicting fraud correctly among all the 
fraud cases. Essentially one gets more false negatives with voting than with predicting fraud 
directly. The likely reason is the fact that voting relies on just 253 cases of fraud when there 
are 347 fraud cases altogether. 
 
4.3.2 Receiving operating curves 
 
The ROC curve for the combined case is drawn by using the median probability prediction 
among the three types 6, 11 and 12 
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Figure 4 ROC curve for the combination of types 6, 11 and 12 
 
Comparison between ROC curves of fraud and the combined fraud types shows that in the 
small false/true positive rate region the combined case seems to perform better, but getting 
higher false positive rates direct fraud prediction produces better results. 
Table 23 Area under the ROC curve for the 6, 11 and 12 fraud types combined 
 
 Combined 6, 11 and 12 Fraud 
AUC 0,6830 0,7103 
AUC s.e. 0,0159 0,0157 
 
Area under the ROC curve is smaller for the combined case than for the fraud itself. Overall 
this would indicate that fraud is predicted better directly than through the types combined. 
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4.3.3 Expected relatives costs, common threshold between types 
 
In this case the expected relative costs are calculated while the fraud prediction for the types 6, 
11 and 12 are made with the common threshold probability and the minimization of expected 
relative cost is made using this common threshold probability. The resulting performance 
measures and expected relative costs are 
Table 24 Expected relative costs for the combination of fraud types 6, 11 and 12 and fraud 
 
 Combined 6, 11 and 12 Fraud 
 
CFP / CFN CFP / CFN 
P(fraud) 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 
0,001 0,0047 0,0149 0,0212 0,0466 0,0047 0,0150 0,0212 0,0464 
0,01 0,0149 0,0464 0,0646 0,1411 0,0149 0,0462 0,0649 0,1423 
0,1 0,0441 0,1342 0,1842 0,3786 0,0439 0,1353 0,1870 0,3865 
 
Table 25 Change in expected relative costs for the combination of fraud types 6, 11 and 12 
compared to fraud 
 
 Change in 
 
CFP / CFN 
P(fraud) 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 
0,001 -0,53 % -0,47 % 0,28 % 0,43 % 
0,01 -0,52 % 0,46 % -0,55 % -0,84 % 
0,1 0,42 % -0,81 % -1,52 % -2,04 % 
 
For most cases the relative costs of the combined type are lower than for fraud. However, 
there are 4 case in the table 25 where the costs of the combined type are actually higher than 
for fraud. The largest decrease of 2,04% is observed for when the prior fraud probability is 0,1 
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and the cost ratio is 0,01. On the other hand for prior fraud probability 0,01 and cost ratio 0,1 
the expected relative cost of the combined type is 0,46% higher than for fraud. 
Table 26 Accuracy for the combined 6, 11 and 12 fraud types and fraud with thresholds 
minimizing the corresponding expected relative costs, the values in bold have p-value below 
0,05/12 and values italized have p-values between 0,05/12 and 0,05 under binomial difference 
test 
 
 Combined 6, 11 and 12 Fraud 
 
CFP / CFN CFP / CFN 
P(fraud) 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 
0,001 
0,9920 
(3,7E-4) 
0,9871 
(4,6E-4) 
0,9839 
(5,2E-4) 
0,9701 
(7,0E-4) 
0,9919 
(3,7E-4) 
0,9870 
(4,7E-4) 
0,9841 
(5,1E-4) 
0,9726 
(6,7E-4) 
0,01 
0,9871 
(4,6E-4) 
0,9701 
(7,0E-4) 
0,9633 
(7,7E-4) 
0,9239 
(0,0011) 
0,9870 
(4,7E-4) 
0,9704 
(7,0E-4) 
0,9639 
(7,7E-4) 
0,9290 
(0,0011) 
0,1 
0,9701 
(7,0E-4) 
0,9239 
(0,0011) 
0,8902 
(0,0013) 
0,8140 
(0,0016) 
0,9704 
(7,0E-4) 
0,9188 
(0,0011) 
0,8865 
(0,0013) 
0,8124 
(0,0016) 
 
Compared to fraud the accuracy with combining types 6, 11 and 12 is pretty much the same. 
Differences are in the 3
rd
 or 4
th
 decimal. Using binomial difference test only two of the 
accuracies are significantly different i.e. p-value below 0,05/12, in bold font, and two values 
with p-values between 0,05/12 and 0,05. In 5 out of 12 cases the accuracy is better for fraud 
than for the combination in the same choices of prior fraud probability and cost ratio as in 
Tables 24 and 25 for expected relative costs. However, the differences are quite small. 
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Table 27 Precision for the combined 6, 11 and 12 fraud types and fraud with thresholds 
minimizing the corresponding expected relative costs 
 
 Combined 6, 11 and 12 Fraud 
 
CFP / CFN CFP / CFN 
P(fraud) 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 
0,001 
0,0426 
(0,0170) 
0,0251 
(0,0075) 
0,0175 
(0,0052) 
0,0196 
(0,0036) 
0,0347 
(0,0153) 
0,0204 
(0,0067) 
0,0194 
(0,0056) 
0,0217 
(0,0040) 
0,01 
0,0251 
(0,0075) 
0,0196 
(0,0036) 
0,0205 
(0,0032) 
0,0158 
(0,0019) 
0,0204 
(0,0067) 
0,0211 
(0,0038) 
0,0193 
(0,0032) 
0,0151 
(0,0019) 
0,1 
0,0196 
(0,0036) 
0,0158 
(0,0019) 
0,0157 
(0,0016) 
0,0139 
(0,0011) 
0,0211 
(0,0038) 
0,0148 
(0,0018) 
0,0146 
(0,0015) 
0,0131 
(0,0011) 
 
Precision is better for combined case than for fraud, except in 4 cases, the same choices of 
parameters as in Tables 24, 25 and 26 for expected relative costs and accuracy. The precision 
tends to be better for small prior fraud probability and when the costs are equal. There were no 
significantly different precision values. In 4 out of 12 cases the precision of fraud is better than 
with the combined type, in the rest the combined model has better precision. This is in contrast 
to the single fraud types, where the precision of fraud was clearly better. The combination has 
improved the precision. Here the differences are in 2
nd
 decimal already. However, precision 
contains only the cases that are predicted to be fraud, both true and false positives, whose 
amounts vary between 100 - 11000. The accuracy uses the whole set of observations, which 
contains 59239 cases in total resulting into more significant p-values. 
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Table 28 Sensitivity for the combined 6, 11 and 12 fraud types and fraud with thresholds 
minimizing the corresponding expected relative costs 
 
 Combined 6, 11 and 12 Fraud 
 
CFP / CFN CFP / CFN 
P(fraud) 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 
0,001 
0,0173 
(0,0070) 
0,0317 
(0,0094) 
0,0317 
(0,0094) 
0,0836 
(0,0149) 
0,0144 
(0,0064) 
0,0259 
(0,0085) 
0,0346 
(0,0098) 
0,0836 
(0,0149) 
0,01 
0,0317 
(0,0094) 
0,0836 
(0,0149) 
0,1124 
(0,0170) 
0,1960 
(0,0213) 
0,0259 
(0,0085) 
0,0893 
(0,0153) 
0,1037 
(0,0164) 
0,1729 
(0,0203) 
0,1 
0,0836 
(0,0149) 
0,1960 
(0,0213) 
0,2882 
(0,0243) 
0,4409 
(0,0267) 
0,0893 
(0,0153) 
0,1960 
(0,0213) 
0,2767 
(0,0240) 
0,4179 
(0,0265) 
 
Combining 6, 11 and 12 fraud types produces better sensitivity values than fraud itself in the 
same cases as in the previous tables 24-27. In 7 out of 12 cases the combination has better 
sensitivity than fraud. However, the standard errors are high enough that none of the values is 
significantly better than other. All p-values under the binomial difference test are above 0,05. 
Note sensitivity contains only the actual fraud cases, 347 altogether, which explains why the 
large differences observed are not significant. 
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Table 29 Specificity for the combined 6, 11 and 12 fraud types and fraud with thresholds 
minimizing the corresponding expected relative costs,  the values in bold have p-value below 
0,05/12 and values italized have p-values between 0,05/12 and 0,05 under binomial difference 
test 
 
 Combined 6, 11 and 12 Fraud 
 
CFP / CFN CFP / CFN 
P(fraud) 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 
0,001 
0,9977 
(2,0E-4) 
0,9927 
(3,5E-4) 
0,9895 
(4,2E-4) 
0,9754 
(6,4E-4) 
0,9976 
(2,0E-4) 
0,9926 
(3,5E-4) 
0,9897 
(4,2E-4) 
0,9778 
(6,1E-4) 
0,01 
0,9927 
(3,5E-4) 
0,9754 
(6,4E-4) 
0,9683 
(7,2E-4) 
0,9282 
(0,0011) 
0,9926 
(3,5E-4) 
0,9756 
(6,4E-4) 
0,9689 
(7,2E-4) 
0,9335 
(0,0010) 
0,1 
0,9754 
(6,4E-4) 
0,9282 
(0,0011) 
0,8938 
(0,0013) 
0,8162 
(0,0016) 
0,9756 
(6,4E-4) 
0,9231 
(0,0011) 
0,8901 
(0,0013) 
0,8147 
(0,0016) 
 
Specificity seems to be better in the combined case when cost ratio is 1 or prior fraud 
probability is 0,1. This time the behaviour does not follow the same pattern as in the previous 
tables. However, the differences are small, of the same order as the standard errors. 
Nevertheless there are 3 specificity values that are significantly different with p-values below 
0,05/12 and one p-value between 0,05/12 and 0,05. 
 
4.3.4 Expected relatives costs, different threshold for each type 
 
In this section we repeat the results of section 4.3.3 but with the threshold probabilities for 
each type set separately. 
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Table 30 Expected relative costs for the combination of fraud types 6, 11 and 12 and fraud 
 
 Combined 6, 11 and 12 Fraud 
 
CFP / CFN CFP / CFN 
P(fraud) 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 
0,001 0,00470 0,01492 0,02112 0,04630 0,00473 0,01500 0,02116 0,04640 
0,01 0,01486 0,04610 0,06444 0,13930 0,01494 0,04615 0,06492 0,14230 
0,1 0,04393 0,13219 0,18110 0,37230 0,04391 0,13529 0,18702 0,38650 
 
Table 31 Change of expected relative costs for combination of fraud types 6, 11 and 12 over 
fraud 
 
 
CFP / CFN 
P(fraud) 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 
0,001 -0,53 % -0,53 % -0,19 % -0,22 % 
0,01 -0,54 % -0,11 % -0,74 % -2,11 % 
0,1 0,05 % -2,29 % -3,17 % -3,67 % 
 
The decrease in expected relative costs with the combination of fraud types 6, 11 and 12 and 
the majority voting compared to fraud decreases between 0,11% - 3,67% except in one case it 
increases by 0,05%. It should be noted that the minimum values for the combination were 
obtained numerically by starting from the common threshold value for all types and then 
minimizing one type at a time. This does not necessarily result into a global minimum, just a 
local minimum. So the results here for the combination present an upper limit for expected 
relative cost and a minimum for the decrease. The actual global minima may result into even 
larger decrease. The threshold probabilities related to the minimum expected relative costs 
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Table 32 Threshold probabilities for the combination of fraud types 6, 11 and 12, threshold 
probability for the combination with common threshold and threshold probability for fraud 
 
  
Combined 6, 11 and 12 
Different threshold probabilities 
Combined 
Common 
threshold 
Fraud 
CFP / CFN P(fraud) 6 11 12 
1 
0,001 0,957 0,958 0,957 0,958 0,933 
0,01 0,914 0,916 0,916 0,916 0,894 
0,1 0,842 0,834 0,85 0,841 0,828 
0,1 
0,001 0,915 0,916 0,916 0,916 0,894 
0,01 0,852 0,834 0,85 0,841 0,828 
0,1 0,695 0,78 0,692 0,730 0,717 
0,05 
0,001 0,904 0,888 0,911 0,898 0,880 
0,01 0,821 0,816 0,824 0,820 0,810 
0,1 0,656 0,754 0,639 0,673 0,677 
0,01 
0,001 0,841 0,834 0,868 0,841 0,834 
0,01 0,735 0,78 0,63 0,730 0,734 
0,1 0,546 0,544 0,636 0,579 0,605 
 
The threshold probabilities do not show much difference between fraud and types. There is a 
general tendency of threshold probabilities to become lower when the cost ratio decreases and 
the prior fraud probability increases. When cost ratio is 1 the threshold probabilities of 
combined case with common threshold for types tend to be higher than for fraud. But when 
the cost ratio decreases, the threshold probabilities of the combined case tend to drop below 
fraud. With different threshold probabilities there is spread around the common threshold 
probability. The spread is larger for the lower cost ratios and larger prior fraud probabilities. 
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Table 33 Accuracy for the combined 6, 11 and 12 fraud types with different threshold 
probabilities and fraud, with thresholds minimizing the corresponding expected relative costs, 
the values in bold have p-value below 0,05/12 and values italized have p-values between 
0,05/12 and 0,05 under binomial difference test 
 
 Combined 6, 11 and 12 Fraud 
 
CFP / CFN CFP / CFN 
P(fraud) 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 
0,001 
0,9919 
(3,7E-4) 
0,9870 
(4,7E-4) 
0,9840 
(5,2E-4) 
0,9714 
(6,9E-4) 
0,9919 
(3,7E-4) 
0,9870 
(4,7E-4) 
0,9841 
(5,1E-4) 
0,9726 
(6,7E-4) 
0,01 
0,9870 
(4,7E-4) 
0,9715 
(6,8E-4) 
0,9632 
(7,7E-4) 
0,9263 
(0,0011) 
0,9870 
(4,7E-4) 
0,9704 
(7,0E-4) 
0,9639 
(7,7E-4) 
0,9290 
(0,0011) 
0,1 
0,9702 
(7,0E-4) 
0,9220 
(0,0011) 
0,8985 
(0,0012) 
0,8035 
(0,0016) 
0,9704 
(7,0E-4) 
0,9188 
(0,0011) 
0,8865 
(0,0013) 
0,8124 
(0,0016) 
 
The behaviour of accuracy is different from the common threshold case in Table 26. Now 
there is no clear behaviour on which accuracy is better. Significant differences in accuracies 
under binomial test are observed for low cost ratios and high prior fraud probability. 
Table 34 Precision for the combined 6, 11 and 12 fraud types with different threshold 
probabilities and fraud, with thresholds minimizing the corresponding expected relative costs 
 
 Combined 6, 11 and 12 Fraud 
 
CFP / CFN CFP / CFN 
P(fraud) 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 
0,001 
0,0423 
(0,0169) 
0,0248 
(0,0074) 
0,0208 
(0,0057) 
0,0213 
(0,0039) 
0,0347 
(0,0153) 
0,0204 
(0,0067) 
0,0194 
(0,0056) 
0,0217 
(0,0040) 
0,01 
0,0247 
(0,0073) 
0,0214 
(0,0039) 
0,0209 
(0,0033) 
0,0175 
(0,0020) 
0,0204 
(0,0067) 
0,0211 
(0,0038) 
0,0193 
(0,0032) 
0,0151 
(0,0019) 
0,1 
0,0209 
(0,0037) 
0,0176 
(0,0020) 
0,0172 
(0,0017) 
0,0143 
(0,0011) 
0,0211 
(0,0038) 
0,0148 
(0,0018) 
0,0146 
(0,0015) 
0,0131 
(0,0011) 
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Precision values for combined classifier are better than for fraud, except in 2 cases. However, 
none of the p-values of the binomial difference test are significant, which was also the case in 
Table 27. 
Table 35 Sensitivity for the combined 6, 11 and 12 fraud types with different threshold 
probabilities and fraud, with thresholds minimizing the corresponding expected relative costs 
 
 Combined 6, 11 and 12 Fraud 
 
CFP / CFN CFP / CFN 
P(fraud) 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 
0,001 
0,0173 
(0,0070) 
0,0317 
(0,0094) 
0,0375 
(0,0102) 
0,0865 
(0,0151) 
0,0144 
(0,0064) 
0,0259 
(0,0085) 
0,0346 
(0,0098) 
0,0836 
(0,0149) 
0,01 
0,0317 
(0,0094) 
0,0865 
(0,0151) 
0,1153 
(0,0171) 
0,2104 
(0,0219) 
0,0259 
(0,0085) 
0,0893 
(0,0153) 
0,1037 
(0,0164) 
0,1729 
(0,0203) 
0,1 
0,0893 
(0,0153) 
0,2248 
(0,0224) 
0,2911 
(0,0244) 
0,4784 
(0,0268) 
0,0893 
(0,0153) 
0,1960 
(0,0213) 
0,2767 
(0,0240) 
0,4179 
(0,0265) 
 
Like precision the sensitivity values are better for combined classifier than for fraud classifier, 
except in one case. However, none of the sensitivities are significantly different under the 
binomial difference test, as with the common threshold case in Table 28. 
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Table 36 Specificity for the combined 6, 11 and 12 fraud types with different threshold 
probabilities and fraud, with thresholds minimizing the corresponding expected relative costs, 
the values in bold have p-value below 0,05/12 and values italized have p-values between 
0,05/12 and 0,05 under binomial difference test 
 
 Combined 6, 11 and 12 Fraud 
 
CFP / CFN CFP / CFN 
P(fraud) 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 1 0,1 0,05 0,01 
0,001 
0,9977 
(2,0E-4) 
0,9926 
(3,5E-4) 
0,9896 
(4,2E-4) 
0,9766 
(6,2E-4) 
0,9976 
(2,0E-4) 
0,9926 
(3,5E-4) 
0,9897 
(4,2E-4) 
0,9778 
(6,1E-4) 
0,01 
0,9926 
(3,5E-4) 
0,9767 
(6,2E-4) 
0,9682 
(7,2E-4) 
0,9305 
(0,0010) 
0,9926 
(3,5E-4) 
0,9756 
(6,4E-4) 
0,9689 
(7,2E-4) 
0,9335 
(0,0010) 
0,1 
0,9753 
(6,4E-4) 
0,9261 
(0,0011) 
0,9020 
(0,0012) 
0,8054 
(0,0016) 
0,9756 
(6,4E-4) 
0,9231 
(0,0011) 
0,8901 
(0,0013) 
0,8147 
(0,0016) 
 
The specificity for the combined classifier is sometimes better than with fraud and sometimes 
worse. This behaves in the similar manner to accuracy in Table 33. The same cases have 
significant differences under the binomial test as with accuracy. Altogether the specificity in 
combined case and fraud are similar. 
Overall the expected relative costs decrease with combined classifier with different threshold 
probabilities compared to fraud classifier even more than with combined classifier with 
common threshold. This is no surprise because different thresholds contain the common 
threshold as a subcase where one puts all the threshold probabilities equal. Therefore the 
minimization over different thresholds should produce a result that is at least as good as with 
the common threshold. At the same time the precision and sensitivity become better for the 
combined classifier than for fraud classifier. The accuracy and specificity are similar between 
the combined and fraud classifiers. Since the expected relative costs are lower and the other 
performance measures better or at the same level, the combined classifier with different 
probability thresholds is better than fraud classifier. However, one cannot make that claim 
based on statistical tests for expected relative costs, because one gets only one value from this 
process. It would be possible to achieve the statistics with repeating the process multiple 
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times. However, that would require more computing resources and was not done for that 
reason. For the other performance measures one is able test the difference using binomial 
difference test. There were 4 cases with accuracy and specificity, where the differences were 
significant corresponding to low cost ratio and high prior fraud probability. This could be 
improved, too, by repeating the process multiple times.  
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5. Discussion 
5.1 Comments on results 
Section 4.2 deals with research question 1. The variables that were chosen in at least 4 of the 5 
folds are presented first. As can be seen there are differences between fraud types in the 
variable selection. What is not seen in the results is that there is quite a lot of variation in the 
number of variables chosen in each fold. For fraud types the number of variables chosen by all 
folds is between 8 – 15, with fraud itself number of variables is 19. If we include the variables 
chosen by just 4 folds, for fraud types the number of variables varies between 4 – 12, and with 
fraud itself it is 6. Typically variables chosen for fraud appeared in at least 3 fraud types, too, 
only total debt to total assets appeared only in one fraud type model 44 and fraud model. The 
results vary when partitioning into folds is varied, different variables get chosen in all 5 folds 
or in 4 folds. One would likely get more stable results with 10 folds, since with 5 folds training 
sets in different folds have 60% of observations the same, with 10 folds training sets in 
different folds would have 80% of observations the same. 
The signs of the coefficients in the logistic regressions (with regularization) are listed in the 
table 13. In most cases the sign is what is predicted in section 2. The variables, which have the 
wrong sign, typically have descriptive statistics showing that the sign is actually what one 
would expect. Predictor variable net sales is an exception. It has descriptive statistics 
supporting positive sign and it is also the predicted sign based on auditing standards. However, 
the actual sign is negative for fraud and fraud types, except the fraud type revenue recognition 
issues has positive sign for the coefficient. Net sales appears with many other variables which 
also contain net sales either in the nominator or denominator in the definitions of the variables. 
So the wrong sign may well be the result of the complicated non-linear dependence on the net 
sales. It may also be that this is an effect of trying to conceal fraud. Two sided accounting 
guarantees that anything wrong in one place of the financial statement causes there to be a 
corresponding mistake in at least one other place. So with the all the other fraud types except 
revenue recognition issues the primary mistake may well be covered with a mistake in net 
sales, which decreases the net sales. 
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Most of the predictor variables have the same sign of the coefficient in all the fraud and fraud 
type logistic regressions. However, 14 of the variables have different signs of the coefficients 
for different fraud types and fraud itself. This may be an indication that these variables are not 
good variables to use directly for predicting fraud, because there are effects that cancel each 
other. This is an issue that could be studied further. 
The results for the naïve threshold probability 0,5 show that the accuracy for fraud is 65,5% 
and for fraud types varies between 63,9% - 74,0%. It is seen that fraud types tend to produce 
better accuracy than fraud itself, only fraud type 20 (inventory, vendor and/or cost of sales 
issues) has lower accuracy than fraud. Precision for fraud is 1,1% whereas fraud types vary 
from 0,27% - 0,51%, so fraud wins this comparison to fraud types. However, if one used just 
weighted coin toss to choose, one would expect the fraud precision to be 0,59% and for fraud 
types it is between 0,12% - 0,23%.
9
 So compared to that benchmark both fraud types and 
fraud precision is roughly twice as much as with weighted random choice. Looking at it from 
this point of view the lower precision results for fraud types seem to be the result of having 
fewer number of cases than fraud totally has. Same reasoning can be applied to the accuracy 
results. It may be that the better accuracy is just a phenomenon of lower amount of fraud types 
than frauds. The sensitivity for fraud is 63,1% and for fraud types it is between 58,1% - 
70,2%. Since sensitivity goes through only observations of fraud and fraud types, these are 
very much comparable and differences cannot be explained away with the number of 
observations. Specificity for fraud is 65,6% and for fraud types it is between 63,9% - 74,1%, 
nearly the same values as with accuracy. Specificity is over the non-fraud or non-fraud type 
observations, and since the relative difference between total number of observations and non-
fraud observations is small, the results are close to each other. As a total it seems that fraud 
types might function a bit better than fraud, when the naïve probability threshold 0,5 is used 
for all them. 
When the threshold probability is changed, the results are expected to change. The ROC 
curves are made for the changing threshold probability. From them one can see that there are 
                                                          
9
 In this case the coin would be weighted according to the frequencies of fraud and total number of observations. 
The probability of any case to be fraud would be the fraction total number of fraud (type) divided by the total 
number of observations. For fraud this would be 347 / 59239 = 0,59%. For fraud types the results are obtained 
similarly from table 3. 
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ranges, where fraud ROC curve is better than fraud type ROC curve, and then there are ranges, 
where the situation is opposite the fraud type ROC curve is better than fraud ROC curve. 
Based on ROC curves it seems that 5 fraud types (6, 7, 11, 12 and 44) have better ROC curve 
than fraud, 1 fraud type (other) has ROC curve that is about as good as fraud ROC curve, and 
2 fraud types (14 and 20) have a ROC curve that is worse than fraud ROC curve. The areas 
under the ROC curve give just one number that measures quality of the ROC curve over the 
whole range of threshold probabilities. The AUC for fraud is 0,710 and for fraud types varies 
between 0,681 – 0,780. The fraud types that were seen to have better ROC curves have also 
larger AUC than fraud, the fraud type other, which had equally good ROC curve, has larger 
AUC than fraud, and fraud types 14 and 20 have a lower AUC than fraud, as can be seen from 
table 15. Based on this it seems that in general the prediction for 5 fraud types is better than 
for fraud. 
The expected relative costs are calculated for fraud only. This is due to the fact that was 
already discussed in section 3. With fraud types one should include more variety in the 
mistakes. Since mistaking the fraud type for non-fraud type could still be another fraud type, 
its cost should reflect this and not be just the cost of false negatives. Likely the cost of 
mistaking a fraud type, when it is of another fraud type in reality, is much smaller than 
mistaking fraud as non-fraud. The ERC for fraud varies between 0,0047 and 0,39 when prior 
fraud probability varies between 0,1% - 10% and the ratios of costs between 0,01 – 1. The 
prior fraud probability 0,1% is likely too small and 10% is too large, the same with the relative 
cost bounds. The minimization of ERC chooses a threshold probability and one can look at 
how the performance measures behave at this threshold probability. The results produced 
compared fraud only to fraud type 6 but the other fraud types had similar results to fraud type 
6. The accuracy of fraud varies between 81,2% and 99,2%, with fraud type 6 the accuracy is 
between 80,6% - 99,1%. The high accuracies are due to high threshold probabilities, which 
can be seen in table 32. The higher the threshold probability, the more predictions are made as 
non-fraud and since the sample is highly imbalanced, the accuracy grows. The precision for 
fraud is between 1,3% - 3,5%, for fraud type 6 it is between 0,6% - 0,85%. This is a result that 
is similar to threshold probability 0,5. In the same way the likely reason for the lower 
precision is the fact that there are less observations for fraud types than for fraud. The 
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sensitivity for fraud varies between 1,4% - 41,8% and for fraud type 6 it is consistently better 
2,2% - 50,4%. Sensitivity increases when prior fraud probability increases and relative cost 
decreases. Specificity is again pretty similar to accuracy, for fraud it is between 81,5% - 
99,8% and for fraud type 6 it is between 80,6% - 99,3%. One should note that the results in 
this paragraph from section 4.2.3 are calculated by optimizing the expected relative costs of 
fraud, not of the fraud types. Fraud type performance measures should really be calculated 
using ERC for them, but this case has not been handled in the literature previously and would 
really require extending the definition of ERC to include also the cost of mistaking fraud type 
to another fraud type. It was easier to bypass the problem with making the combined type, 
with which one can operate with the usual ERC definition. 
Combining of fraud types 6, 11 and 12 to predict fraud is based on the ROC curves, and the 
fact that these three types covered the largest amount of fraud cases among the three type 
combinations in the five types, which had better ROC curves than fraud ROC curve. With 
more types included one could get better coverage of fraud cases, but since the minimum ERC 
had to be found numerically, the number of types needed to be as low as possible. With better 
method one might be able to use larger combinations. 
When using the voting for the combination and common threshold probability 0,5 for all three 
types, the performance measures are better for combination with the exception of sensitivity, 
as can be seen in table 55. The ROC curve for the combination is worse than the fraud ROC 
curve and this is also shown by AUC for the combination is 0,683 and for fraud it is 0,710. 
Although in general the ROC curve for the combination is worse than for fraud, in the low 
false positive region which is the region that matters most here, the ROC curve for the 
combination is slightly better than for fraud. 
In general the ERC of the combination for the common threshold probability for all the three 
types decreases from the ERC for fraud. However, there are 4 cases of prior fraud probability 
and relative cost ratio out of 12, where the ERC for the combination increases compared to 
fraud, as can be seen in table 25. The change in ERC varies between -2,0% and 0,46% 
depending on the prior fraud probability and the cost ratio. With the threshold probabilities 
minimizing ERC the accuracy of the combination is better than with fraud in 6 cases out of 12, 
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but the differences are very small. There are only 2 cases where the difference is significant as 
can be seen in table 26. The precision is better for the combination than for the fraud in 
exactly the same cases as with the ERC, but none of the differences are significant. The 
sensitivity has the same behaviour pattern as precision, but some of the cases have equal 
sensitivity. The specificity has otherwise the same behaviour pattern as accuracy, but 3 of the 
differences in specificities are significant. Altogether the differences in the results between the 
combination type and fraud are small. In order to get ERC decrease larger than 1 percent the 
prior fraud probability has to be unrealistically large 0,1. With realistic values the ERC 
differences are below 1 percent. However, since the threshold probabilities are kept the same, 
the minimum may not be the true one. With different threshold probabilities a true minimum is 
obtained. 
Since there is no reason why one should use the same threshold probability for all the types, 
the condition is relaxed. However, the minimum with same threshold was calculated using a 
grid of threshold values 0, 0,001, … 1, which gives a good approximation of the minimum. 
With different thresholds this would result into a grid with 10
9
 values. This goes beyond 
computer ability to handle the grid in memory, and would take a lot of time to go through. For 
this reason the minimization with different thresholds is done numerically, one type at a time 
until convergence starting from the common threshold probability for all the types. There 
might be a result that is even lower than what is obtained, since there is no guarantee that a 
global minimum is found for ERC in this way, only a local minimum. Now the ERC decreases 
for all cases but one, prior fraud probability 0,1 and relative cost ratio 1 results to increase of 
0,05% for ERC. For the other cases the change in ERC is between -0,11% and -3,7%. ROC 
curve cannot be drawn for this case since it requires common threshold. The accuracy is better 
for fraud than for the combination in 5 cases, in 3 cases they are equal, and in 4 cases the 
combination has better accuracy than fraud. The differences are significant only in cases 
where the prior fraud probability is high 0,1 or relative cost ratio is 0,01, meaning likely 
unrealistic cases. The precision is higher for the combination in 10 cases out of 12. However, 
the differences are not significant and less than 1%. Sensitivity is also higher for the 
combination than for fraud in 10 cases out of 12 with not significant differences, but the size 
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of differences varies between 0,1% - 6,0%. The specificity has the same behaviour pattern as 
accuracy.  
ERC significance could not be tested because one gets only one minimum from this process. 
By repeating the same process multiple times one could produce statistics for ERC, too. 
Repeating the process could also improve the statistics of performance measures so that 
differences might become significant. Also having 10-fold cross validation instead of 5-fold 
cross validation should help, too, because different folds have less variation between them in 
their training sets. 
 
5.2 Comparison with published articles 
The main article, which was followed here, was done by Perols (2011). Perols produced the 
results for expected relative costs. His results are on the range that were produced here. He 
does not give other performance measures. He does have area under the curve 0,823 which is 
much higher than obtained here for fraud 0,706 and higher than AUC for best fraud type 
0,780. The reasons for this could be that Perols did much more thorough preprocessing than 
was done in this study. He undersampled the non-fraud cases before fitting, whereas in this 
study the fraud or fraud type cases were replicated, so the approach here is oversampling. He 
also used 10-fold cross validation that was repeated 10 times to get his results. One difference 
is that he made the predictor variable selection with the whole dataset before partitioning to 
training and test sets. Second difference is that when fitting the model in the training set, 
Perols used ERC as the criterion for setting fitting parameters. This is of course more 
preferable instead of using the accuracy as the criterion as was done in this study. The choice 
was based on the problems with using ERC for fitting fraud types as explained earlier. This is 
an issue that needs development. In any case if one were to use these methods in real situation, 
one should use the cost matrix of the stakeholder, whose point of view is taken. 
A continuation of Perols’ work is Perols et al. (2017) which uses advanced undersampling 
methods. In this study there is also hidden the usage of fraud types as one case. With prior 
fraud probability 0,6% and cost ratio 1:30 = 0,033 they had 9,6% and 10,8% decreases in 
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ERC. The prior fraud probability used is based on article by Bell and Carcello (2000) and the 
cost ratio on article by Bayley and Taylor (2007). The prior fraud probability is based on 
article from 2000, whereas ACFE (2018) mentioned that financial professionals think that 
fraud could be as large as 5%. Of course this number is fraud totally, not just the financial 
statement fraud, so it is unclear what numbers should be used. Nevertheless their numbers are 
much better than what is produced here. On the other hand the results have been obtained 
using support vector machines, not logistic regression and the number of predictor variables is 
109 to start with in their study. However, they did produce results for AUC and logistic 
regression when using the methods for financial statement misclassification. Their results for 
logistic regression AUC varies between 0,741 – 0,770. This is at the same order as the best 
fraud type AUCs produced in this study. In this study 10-fold cross validation was used, but in 
contrast to (Perols, 2011) the variable selection is done after the partition to training and test 
sets, as is done in this study, too. As mentioned by Perols et al. (2017) it is expected, that the 
fraud types can have different variables in the fitting. This is seen in this study since different 
variables got selected for fraud types compared to fraud. They obtained the same thing by 
partitioning the variables into fraud types from the start. Maybe that should have been done 
here, too, instead of relying recursive feature elimination. 
Fanning and Cogger (1998) had the test set accuracy, as they called their performance 
measures, for logit model 50% for total sample, 67% for fraud and 33% for non-fraud cases. 
The first is the accuracy, the second is the sensitivity and the third is the specificity used here. 
These are calculated with threshold probability 0,5 according to Perols (2011). Feroz et al. 
(2000) calculated ERC for logit model and the result varied between 0,095 – 0,688 when prior 
fraud probability varied between 0,1% – 0,5% and cost ratio varied between 0,02 – 1. It seems 
that in this study better results are obtained. The accuracy they had for 0,1% prior fraud 
probability was 88%, lower than what was obtained here. 
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6. Conclusions 
6.1 Research summary 
This thesis studied using the fraud types obtained from the Audit Analytics dataset to predict 
both fraud type and fraud itself by combining the fraud types using majority voting. It was 
found that the fraud types produce similar performance as fraud when measured using the 
accuracy, precision, sensitivity and specificity, both with threshold probability 0,5 and the 
threshold probability minimizing the expected relative costs. The performance is dependent on 
the prior fraud probability and the cost ratio of false positives to false negatives used. There 
are some differences in the variables that get chosen when using fraud types instead of fraud. 
Fraud had 19 variables in the 5 folds chosen and 6 more in just 4 out of 5 folds. The results are 
in Table 12. Fraud types had between 8-15 variables chosen in 5 folds and between 2-12 
chosen in 4 out of 5 folds. So altogether fraud had 25 variables chosen in at least 4 out of 5 
folds, fraud types had between 14-23 variables chosen in at least 4 out of 5 folds. It seems that 
fraud types do not need as many variables as fraud, which is an expected result. Holding 
period return in the violation period did not get chosen at all in fraud types or fraud. Whether 
new securities were issued and value of issued securities to market value were chosen in all 
fraud types and fraud models. Accounts receivable, accounts receivable to total assets, big 4 
auditor, net sales, and whether standard industry classification is between 3000-3999 or not 
were chosen in 8 out of 9 fraud types and fraud models. Therefore these 2+5 variables could 
be considered the most important for detecting fraud. The significance of the coefficients were 
based on a biased estimator, which has its variance restricted by the regularization parameter, 
so one has to take the significance results with some prejudice.  
The usage of fraud types allows one to answer questions, which one is not able answer when 
using just binary fraud classification. It only predicts whether financial statement is fraudulent 
or not. With the fraud types one can direct attention to where the problem is: revenues, costs, 
receivables, payables etc. This was discussed by Perols et al. (2017), too, who used just 4 
types revenues, costs, assets and liabilities. Here the fraud types were based on the data itself. 
They are listed in Table 3 in section 3.4 and they are 1. revenue recognition issues, 2. expense 
recording issues, 3. foreign, related party, affiliated, or subsidiary issues, 4. liabilities, 
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payables, reserves and accrual estimate failures, 5. accounts/loans receivable, investments and 
cash issues, 6. inventory, vendor and/or cost of sales issues, 7. foreign, subsidiary only issues 
and 8. all the other issues not in previous categories. Categorization here is more detailed than 
with Perols et al. Although the using fraud types improved the results compared to fraud, the 
improvement was not as large as with Perols et al. So it seems that having more detailed 
categorization does not help. Furthermore the performance measures of the fraud types are 
comparable to the performance measures of fraud. The AUC for fraud types varies between 
0,68-0,78, the AUC for fraud is 0,71. 
Three fraud types were combined using majority voting to make a new fraud predictor. The 
performance of this was compared to fraud classification performance both with the same 
probability threshold for all types and then with different threshold probabilities for the types. 
With common thresholds the change in the expected relative costs is between -2,0% and 
0,46% compared to fraud. With different threshold probabilities the change is between -3,7% 
and 0,05% compared to fraud. The other performance measures are of the same order as with 
fraud, sometimes better, sometimes worse. The accuracy varies between 0,80-0,99 for the 
combined type and between 0,81-0,99 for fraud. The precision varies between 0,014-0,042 for 
the combined type and between 0,013-0,035 for fraud. The sensitivity varies between 0,017-
0,48 for the combined type and between 0,014-0,42 for fraud. The specificity varies between 
0,805-0,998 for the combined type and between 0,815-0,998 for fraud. Differences are not 
generally significant. The ROC curve for fraud was slightly better as was the AUC, for fraud 
0,71 for the combination 0,68. With more fraud types combined to use voting one might get 
even better results. At least one would have a better coverage of fraud cases than with just 
three fraud types. 
 
6.2 Limitations of the study 
The results cannot be generalized to different countries. The data is for US firms and fraud is 
defined by its laws. What might be fraudulent behaviour in US according to their laws might 
be allowed in other countries. The laws have also changed during the years, so there might be 
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problems in the data due to this. What was criminal behaviour 20 years ago might not be that 
today and vice versa. The cross validation method uses all the data to fit and test the model 
and the partition is made randomly.  Because of this in some folds one uses the fitted model to 
predict future based past, and in other folds model fitted on future data to predict past. 
Therefore there may be bias in the results because of this. However, this approach is used in 
the published articles, too. 
The predictions should be used only as an indication that one should look more carefully in the 
financial statement and into the accounting records, if one has access to them. Fraud is a 
criminal act that has to go through legal process. Predictions have errors and depending on 
how the probability thresholds are set, the amount of errors can be smaller or larger. Accusing 
of fraud based on a prediction of a model can lead into adverse legal consequences. 
 
6.3 Suggestions for further research 
Some ideas were identified already in the introduction. Namely if one gets hold of the 
financial impact data of Audit Analytics, one might try to predict the financial impact of fraud, 
which would be useful to people trying find fraud and other stakeholders. People trying to find 
fraud could use financial impact prediction to determine how much resources should be 
assigned for the task. Outside stakeholders would be more interested in how much is the 
financial statement wrong. If the result of the company is in millions and financial impact 
prediction is less than one hundred thousand, maybe it is not so important in the big picture. 
As far as I know this has not been attempted before, likely due to lack of data, which would 
contain the financial impact information. 
One could enlarge the fraud type prediction to a misstatement type prediction in the same way 
as was done by Dutta et al. (2017). They essentially repeated the same with misstatements 
what Perols (2011) did with fraud . To some degree Perols et al. (2017) have already done this, 
but they did not use the same data source as Dutta et al. (2017). 
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One could add other variables. Although the 109 variables used by Perols et al. (2017) are 
probably more than enough. Rather one should think more towards specializing in the fraud 
type prediction. One should think about theoretical reasons for the variables in fraud type 
fitting. Perols et al. did not give much reasoning for putting variables into different fraud type 
classes or give a list of what belongs where. In connection to this one should consider the 
differences in the signs of the coefficients between the different fraud types and fraud, which 
was observed here. Some variables may well require to be considered with respect to a fraud 
type. 
In this study recursive feature elimination was used. One might consider using stepwise 
forward selection where one adds variables one by one until no improvement is observed. At 
least this would likely lead to models with fewer variables. 
Combination of fraud types can be done in several ways. One can use hard majority vote as 
was done in this study. Perols et al. (2017) seem to have used the method: fraud is predicted if 
one fraud type is predicted, although it is not clear. One could build several voting 
mechanisms: at least one type predicted, 2 types predicted then fraud, 3 types etc. The number 
fraud types used can also vary. In connection to this one should develop the expected relative 
costs for fraud types to include the different possibilities of mistakes, which exist in this case, 
or give clear reasons why the fraud based expected relative costs is sufficient. 
One can also test whether more sophisticated models like neural networks would produce 
better results with more data than what was used by Perols (2011) and Perols et al. (2017). If 
the results of Dutta et al. (2017) for the study misstatements is any indication, this could be the 
case. However, the data imbalance with misstatements is much lower than with fraud. 
One might make a training and test set partition based on time using the latest years as the test 
set. However, if one does this, one should leave the last few years out of the dataset, because 
fraud is typically found only afterwards. The latest years likely contain cases of fraud that 
have not been found yet, thus biasing the results. If the training is made on past data and tested 
on future, the training data likely contains all the fraud found and the test data does not unless 
one leaves the last years out of the dataset. Nevertheless it might be an interesting to test it. 
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Appendix 
Table 37 Descriptive statistics of continuous predictor variables separately for fraud and non-
fraud observations 
 
Fraud 
predictor 
Fraud 
value 
count mean Std min 25% 50% 75% max 
1 
1 347 802,6 1850,7 0,453 23,18 122,9 357,6 8918,0 
0 58892 390,9 1214,4 0,058 6,983 38,34 190,4 8918,0 
2 
1 347 0,201 0,118 0,0082 0,133 0,183 0,237 0,688 
0 58892 0,167 0,107 0,0082 0,106 0,155 0,210 0,688 
3 
1 347 0,217 0,121 0,012 0,128 0,195 0,277 0,599 
0 58892 0,171 0,121 0,0058 0,082 0,148 0,232 0,599 
4 
1 347 35,80 90,41 0,000 0,588 2,745 16,69 382,0 
0 58892 15,30 51,53 0,000 0,200 1,100 5,870 382,0 
5 
1 347 0,067 0,105 0,000 0,014 0,032 0,071 0,922 
0 58892 0,068 0,128 0,000 0,014 0,031 0,065 0,922 
6 
1 347 0,013 0,019 0,000 0,0020 0,0060 0,016 0,138 
0 58892 0,010 0,019 0,000 0,0018 0,0044 0,0099 0,138 
7 
1 347 2,792 5,298 -53,69 1,877 2,571 4,065 19,11 
0 58892 2,341 9,007 -53,69 1,263 2,784 4,719 29,69 
9 
1 347 9,9E-5 0,032 -0,162 -0,0077 0,000 0,0073 0,210 
0 58892 -1,8E-4 0,051 -0,244 -0,0098 0,000 0,0076 0,211 
10 
1 347 1,035 0,407 0,217 0,904 0,987 1,096 4,372 
0 58892 1,068 0,560 0,217 0,868 0,993 1,131 4,372 
11 
1 347 1,695 4,227 -18,53 0,576 1,272 2,348 26,27 
0 58892 1,278 4,374 -18,53 0,358 0,886 1,771 26,27 
14 
1 347 0,429 0,295 0,038 0,185 0,341 0,636 1,527 
0 58892 0,534 0,421 0,023 0,214 0,424 0,750 2,152 
15 
1 347 0,085 0,176 -0,358 -0,012 0,047 0,143 1,066 
0 58892 0,092 0,232 -0,358 -0,011 0,053 0,138 1,487 
16 
1 347 0,322 0,262 -1,663 0,175 0,328 0,452 0,872 
0 58892 0,353 0,316 -1,663 0,225 0,352 0,516 0,912 
17 
1 347 -0,327 1,227 -9,214 -0,409 -0,0059 0,272 0,875 
0 58892 -0,363 1,394 -9,214 -0,424 0,0085 0,25 0,875 
18 
1 347 -0,019 0,861 -5,084 -0,191 -0,023 0,111 5,267 
0 58892 1,1E-4 0,986 -6,075 -0,213 -0,022 0,150 6,078 
19 
1 347 0,095 0,095 0,000 0,011 0,078 0,139 0,457 
0 58892 0,116 0,123 0,000 0,014 0,093 0,170 0,667 
20 
1 347 4126,9 9501,0 2,901 127,6 740,8 2437,5 57428,0 
0 58892 2704,3 8010,1 0,546 49,12 278,1 1390,6 57428,0 
22 1 347 -0,0053 0,070 -1,021 -5,0E-6 2,0E-5 1,4E-4 0,025 
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0 58892 -0,028 0,170 -1,496 -1,9E-4 1,5E-5 1,9E-4 0,025 
23 
1 347 0,215 0,178 0,0093 0,077 0,163 0,305 0,820 
0 58892 0,252 0,217 0,0053 0,081 0,185 0,364 0,879 
24 
1 347 1,320 0,875 0,070 0,668 1,115 1,614 4,656 
0 58892 1,185 0,841 0,070 0,614 0,993 1,513 4,656 
26 
1 347 98,86 520,7 -237,0 0,055 2,815 7,434 3535,3 
0 58892 194,0 790,7 -237,0 -1,484 3,352 13,78 3535,3 
27 
1 347 -0,067 0,126 -1,076 -0,090 -0,047 -0,014 0,266 
0 58892 -0,010 0,231 -1,616 -0,111 -0,055 -0,014 0,266 
28 
1 347 0,600 0,390 0,067 0,398 0,576 0,7106 3,780 
0 58892 0,593 0,488 0,067 0,338 0,521 0,694 3,780 
29 
1 347 -2,301 2,121 -19,23 -2,790 -1,734 -1,090 0,491 
0 58892 -2,703 2,611 -19,23 -3,370 -2,137 -1,268 0,491 
34 
1 347 1,032 0,204 0,000 1,000 1,004 1,067 1,743 
0 58892 0,942 0,355 0,000 1,000 1,000 1,038 1,743 
35 
1 347 -0,034 0,239 -0,880 -0,136 -0,028 0,062 1,369 
0 58892 2,0E-4 0,355 -1,654 -0,142 -0,023 0,074 2,642 
 
 
 
Table 38 P-values of continuous predictor variables under the χ2 homogeneity test 
 
 
Fraud type 
Pred. 6 7 11 12 14 20 44 other Fraud 
1 1,5E-7 0,710 5,6E-11 5,5E-6 5,6E-8 6,1E-7 5,8E-14 1,1E-7 1,4E-13 
2 7,6E-8 1,2E-4 4,3E-9 5,4E-7 1,6E-5 0,085 2,6E-6 0,009 6,1E-8 
3 7,5E-4 3,4E-8 1,1E-7 5,6E-7 5,2E-4 0,112 2,3E-8 3,9E-4 9,0E-11 
4 1,3E-12 0,021 8,4E-11 0,058 1,5E-10 1,3E-7 7,2E-9 1,4E-4 2,3E-11 
5 3,3E-4 0,734 0,794 0,084 0,791 0,500 0,251 0,804 0,790 
6 2,0E-9 0,007 0,009 1,7E-6 3,2E-4 0,023 0,009 0,104 1,8E-6 
7 0,002 0,670 3,9E-7 2,8E-4 1,7E-5 1,9E-5 2,9E-6 5,1E-6 5,1E-13 
9 0,660 0,051 0,215 0,727 0,823 0,186 0,151 0,031 0,212 
10 0,003 0,320 3,4E-4 0,163 0,004 0,288 1,8E-4 0,277 6,2E-4 
11 0,002 0,353 0,002 0,011 0,119 0,021 0,019 0,003 1,1E-6 
  
 
 
100 
 
14 0,013 0,049 0,319 7,3E-4 0,458 0,002 0,108 0,392 0,004 
15 0,799 0,032 0,235 0,220 0,085 0,036 0,115 0,211 0,436 
16 0,071 2,8E-4 0,045 0,020 0,024 0,040 0,021 6,4E-5 3,7E-5 
17 0,201 0,798 0,913 0,139 0,790 0,918 0,852 0,634 0,591 
18 0,080 0,961 0,612 0,263 0,073 0,212 0,859 0,150 0,299 
19 0,162 0,016 6,5E-5 0,644 0,053 0,039 0,025 0,572 0,004 
20 4,2E-4 0,324 2,1E-5 7,4E-4 1,0E-7 4,0E-4 1,8E-8 1,7E-4 3,2E-9 
22 0,040 0,307 3,1E-4 0,180 0,001 0,010 0,009 0,053 2,0E-4 
23 3,0E-4 0,428 0,070 0,047 0,006 0,001 0,027 0,120 0,080 
24 8,6E-5 0,033 0,045 0,569 4,4E-4 0,017 0,018 0,299 0,072 
26 8,1E-4 0,212 1,4E-4 0,023 9,2E-5 0,010 0,003 0,039 5,3E-8 
27 0,014 0,950 0,220 0,080 0,183 0,051 0,334 0,126 0,031 
28 0,026 0,678 0,095 0,182 0,336 0,478 0,145 0,014 0,002 
29 1,1E-5 0,058 0,002 8,2E-6 0,860 0,156 8,9E-6 0,702 1,2E-4 
34 2,7E-5 0,120 1,5E-7 1,6E-4 0,016 5,9E-5 0,064 1,1E-10 1,1E-9 
35 0,141 0,369 0,646 0,754 0,801 0,324 0,266 0,881 0,672 
 
 
 
 
